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"I'M AN INDIAN OUTLAW, HALF CHEROKEE AND
CHOCTAW": CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND
THE QUESTION OF INDIAN STATUS
Weston Meyring2
ABSTRACT
This Article provides guidance to federal, state, and tribal
courts presented with the question of whether an individual is an
Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. Although an under-
standing of the term "Indian" is "[flundamental to virtually all anal-
ysis of Indian law,"3 the scholarly literature is devoid of a modem
in-depth review and analysis of who is an Indian under the major
federal criminal statutes. As a result, judges and their law clerks,
most of whom do not specialize in federal Indian law, are left with-
out a comprehensive source for the law, history, and policy needed
to formulate a case-by-case analysis of an issue profoundly affecting
1. TIM McGRAw, Indian Outlaw, on NOT A MOMENT Too SOON (Curb Records 1994).
2. A.B., Brown University, 1995; J.D., Gonzaga University School of Law, Magna Cum
Laude, 2005. Member of the Idaho State Bar and the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho. The author is clerking until 2007 for the Honorable Sergio A. Gutierrez
of the Idaho Court of Appeals. The author's views expressed herein do not reflect in any
way the position of the Idaho Court of Appeals. The author may be contacted at
wmeyring@gmail.com.
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the sovereignty of Indian tribes. This Article explicates the Indian
status test and argues it must be construed broadly as intended by
Congress. Importantly, the Indian status test connotes an expan-
sive view of tribal membership, and, faithfully applied, helps to
avoid potential equal protection problems raised by the legislative
response to Duro v. Reina.
4
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I don't see how you can simultaneously be an Indian and not be an
Indian.
5
Leslie R. Weatherhead, Attorney for Duane Garvais
[Tihe issue of how one ought to determine Indian status under the
federal statutes governing crimes in Indian country is extraordina-
rily complex and involves a number of competing policy considera-
tions. 6
Judge Henry, United States Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
It is to be expected that in the effort to advance the Indian from his
semi-savage condition, and to change his tribal condition into indi-
vidual citizenship, many anomalous situations will arise, which
must be viewed in the light of all the legislation upon the same sub-
ject. ... 7
Judge Shiras, United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska
For nothing in this world today is more complex, difficult, disputed,




"The case of special agent Duane Garvais has reached Wash-
ington's congressional delegation and the highest levels of the
troubled Bureau of Indian Affairs," reported Spokane, Washing-
ton's newspaper in 2004.9 Mr. Garvais was employed by the BIA
due, in part, to the agency's established preference for hiring en-
rolled member Indians 10-a preference mechanism approved by
the United States Supreme Court in Morton v. Mancari.11 On his
employment application, Garvais claimed he had a documented
blood degree of five-eighths and was pending enrollment with the
5. Bill Morlin, BIA Firing Complicated by Rulings: Former Agent Garvais' Status as
an Indian Unclear After Conflicts in Two U.S. Courts, THE SPOKEsMAN-REVIEW, July 14,
2004, at B1. The district court considered whether Garvais was an Indian, even though the
BIA had determined he was not an Indian for employment preference purposes. Id.
6. United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2001).
7. United States v. Flournoy Live-Stock & Real Estate Co., 69 F. 886, 891 (Neb. 1895).
8. Louis OWENS, MIXEDBLOOD MESSAGES (1998), quoted in Alan R. Velie, Indian Iden-
tity in the Nineties, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 189 (1998).
9. Bill Morlin, BIA Agent Says He's a Victim of Retaliation After Investigating Reports
of Police Corruption on Spokane Reservation, He Faces Tribal Charges, THE SPOKESMAN-
REVIEW, Jan. 19, 2004, at Al.
10. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1934).
11. 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential" Treat-
ment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943 (2002).
3
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Assiniboine tribe. 12 Four years later, however, while being prose-
cuted by the Spokane Tribe on charges of mishandling undercover
drug funds, Garvais professed not to be an Indian under the crimi-
nal jurisdiction of the tribe.13 The BIA then terminated his em-
ployment after determining that Special Agent Garvais was sim-
ply an Indian descendant and not an enrolled member of any fed-
erally recognized tribe. 14 Nevertheless, the Spokane Tribe
continued to claim that Garvais was an Indian subject to prosecu-
tion in tribal court.
Cases like In re Garvais present an opportunity for courts to
reexamine the federal common law15 pertaining to the definition
of who is an Indian under the criminal jurisdiction statutes.16 Af-
ter more than one hundred years of acquiescing to Congress' ple-
nary power' 7 to divest tribes of any remaining sovereignty, courts
have been slow to acknowledge recent attempts by Congress to re-
store tribal sovereignty and encourage self-determination.' 8 In-
dian law scholars often criticize the courts for failing to properly
weigh modern policy regarding the federal-tribal relationship.' 9
12. In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (E.D. Wash. 2004).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. "This is really judge-made law as to what an Indian is." -Senior U.S. District
Court Judge Justin Quackenbush, quoted in Bill Morlin, Court Ponders Definition of Amer-
ican Indian; Spokane Tribe Wants to Prosecute Former BIA Agent in Tribal Court, THE
SPoKEsMAN-REVIEw, Aug. 10, 2004, at B3.
16. QUESTION: There's some ambiguity about what Indian refers to. Is it - must it
be someone who is enrolled in an Indian tribe or can it be anyone who is the child of
Indian parents?
MR. KNEEDLER: It - generally, it has been understood to require a tribal affilia-
tion. First of all, the definition under - under the Indian Civil Rights Act for tribal
power, Congress adopted the same meaning of Indian that is applied under the Fed-
eral criminal statutes for the purpose of having the two mesh completely.
QUESTION: Yes, but what is that? What is that definition?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No. 03-107).
17. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 217-20 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982 ed.) [hereinafter STRICKLAND].
18. Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L.
REV. 5, 19 (2004); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of
States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 281
(2001) [hereinafter Getches, Beyond Indian Law]; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina
and the Legislation that Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 767 (1993).
19. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judi-
cial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 79 (1999)
(criticizing Court for Anglocentric analogical reasoning and for abandoning its canons of
statutory construction). "It is ironic, as well, that this judicial shift [toward bringing the
Constitution to Indian country] has occurred in a time in which the express congressional
and executive policy has been to promote, not undercut, tribal sovereignty." Id. See also
4
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But in United States v. Lara,20 the United States Supreme Court
validated an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act 21 af-
firming the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes to exercise crimi-
nal jurisdiction over all Indians. 22 The unanswered question, not
before the Lara Court, remains whether congressional allowance
of tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians, but not non-Indians,
violates the equal protection guarantee incorporated within the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 23
The equal protection problem, 24 to a great degree, turns upon
the legal definition of Indian25 and its corollaries - member and
nonmember Indian.26 While the profession of lawyers and judges
Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts Over
Non-Member Indians, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 70 (1991) (criticizing "judicial narrowing of the
scope and purpose of federal power over Indian affairs to reach only enrolled members of
federally recognized Indian tribes .... " Id. at text following n.41).
20. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
21. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1990).
22. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210.
23. Id. at 208-09. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court:
That [due process] argument (if valid) would show that any prosecution of a non-
member Indian under the statute is invalid .... [Wie need not, and we shall not,
consider the merits of Lara's due process claim. Other defendants in tribal pro-
ceedings remain free to raise that claim should they wish to do so. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1303 (vesting district courts with jurisdiction over habeas writs from tribal
courts).
Id. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954) (incorporating equal protection into
Fifth Amendment); see also Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 931-35 (9th Cir. 2005).
24. QUESTION: Indian tribal members are persons within the United States to
whom the Due Process Clause is applicable. Imagine a tribe that does not give you
counsel in a criminal trial. That could happen. All right? Now, is there a basis under
the Due Process Clause for distinguishing between whether the defendant in such a
case is, A, a member of that tribe; B, a non-tribe member but an Indian; C, a non-
Indian?
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 19. See also David Williams, Sometimes
Suspect: A Response to Professor Goldberg-Ambrose, 39 UCLA L. REV. 191 (1991); Carole E.
Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples," 39 UCLA L.
REV. 169 (1991); David Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as
Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991); Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom
Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1489-91
(1991); Peter Tasso, Note, Greywater v. Joshua and Tribal Jurisdiction Over Nonmember
Indians, 75 IOWA L. REV. 685 (1990).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rymer, J.,
dissenting) (advocating a narrow definition of Indian status to avoid equal protection
problems); Clay R. Smith, "Indian" Status: Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom, ADvOcATE
(Idaho State Bar), Mar. 2003, at 18; Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Mem-
bership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision,
55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 82-84 (1993); O'Brien, supra note 24, at 1481-89.
26. Deloria & Newton, supra note 19, at text accompanying n.48:
Consistently interpreting the term 'Indian' as including both members and non-
members, federal courts have developed a definition of who is an Indian for pur-
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is usually characterized by facility for language, analysis, and
communication, in the realm of federal Indian law many briefs
and opinions are admittedly schizophrenic and indiscriminate
when using terms of Indian status and ethnicity.27 In general, a
person can be an ethnic Indian without being a legal Indian; but,
when getting down to specifics, the melding of race and politics
plays havoc with most attempts to achieve precision through lan-
guage. The legal terms "member Indian" and "nonmember Indian"
create further confusion. 28 As suggested in this Article, those ad-
ditional terms of art, from the point of view of a specific tribe, dif-
ferentiate individuals who are recognized as members of the spe-
cific tribe from those who are members of another tribe. Member
and nonmember do not necessarily refer to enrollment status in a
tribe. 29 The confusion over definitions and terms makes stare deci-
sis a minefield, even for federal Indian law practitioners. This Ar-
ticle identifies and attempts to clarify the criminal jurisdiction
problem, and shows that equal protection concerns in this context
can be avoided in most cases by adhering to a principled determi-
nation of Indian status.
Part II of this Article briefly outlines the state of criminal ju-
risdiction in Indian Country. Part III surveys the case law, in-
cluding the pre-Duro v. Reina (Duro II) line of cases endorsed by
Congress as the means to defining Indian status with respect to
federal criminal jurisdiction and to the inherent power of Indian
poses of the federal criminal statutes that also requires a sufficient recognition
and identification in the community as an Indian to prevent the arbitrary applica-
tion of the term to someone who has had only a tenuous connection with his or her
Indian heritage.
27. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1140-41, 1141 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Duro
I]; David Wilkins, The Manipulation of Indigenous Status: The Federal Government as
Shape-Shifter, 12 STAN. L. & POL'v REV. 223, 224 (2001); Dussias, supra note 25, at 80-81;
Patricia Owen, Note, Who is an Indian? Duro v. Reina's Examination of Tribal Sovereignty
and Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 161, 178-79
(1988).
28. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Duro 11, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Grey-
water v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641
(1977).
29. Scholars have correctly described "three classes of Indian people" affected by Duro
IL That classification scheme follows the Duro II Court's lexicon in which membership
equals enrollment. This Article, however, rejects an enrollment-confined definition of mem-
bership as inconsistent with the subsequent Duro-fix. See infra text accompanying notes
376-77. See also The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Jurisdiction in Indian Country:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on H.R. 972, 102nd Cong. 159
(1991) (statement of Philip S. Deloria) ("Now when I tried to ask some people... [in the
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tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. Part III
also examines the blood and recognition prongs of the Rogers test
and discusses the many possible interpretations of that test. Part
IV argues that the intent of Congress as expressed in the Duro-fix
legislation mandates a return to a less cramped view of the Rogers
test. Before concluding, Part V of this Article discusses the courts'
role in averting a constitutional crisis, and provides an additional
recommendation to Congress to further address the concerns of
both tribes and nonconsensual parties.
II. DETERMINING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: NON-INDI4NS,
MEMBER INDIANS AND NONMEMBER INDIANS
Scholars and judges are predicting a constitutional crisis as a
result of the conflict between the individual rights of United
States citizens and the group rights of American Indian tribes.
30
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the inherent
sovereignty of tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over both
nonmember Indians and member Indians, but declined to address
the equal protection question.
31
The equal protection issue has been brewing ever since the
Court decided in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe that Indian
tribes, as "domestic dependent nations,"32 were implicitly divested
of all sovereignty over the prosecution of non-Indians. 33 Sixteen
days later, the Court in United States v. Wheeler reaffirmed a
tribe's assertion of criminal jurisdiction over "member"34 Indians
as being necessary for control of internal relations and preserva-
tion of the tribe's "unique customs and social order."35 Subse-
30. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indi-
ans, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 334-37 (2004); Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or
Not so Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 271 (2003); L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 747-48 (2001) [hereinafter Gould, Mixing Bodies].
31. Lara, 541 U.S. at 209-10; see also Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 932 (9th
Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that, although Means's equal protection argument had "real
force," Indian tribes do not have to comply with the United States Constitution).
32. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
33. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). For a chart simplifying
the convolutions of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country, see WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 168 (3d ed. 1998).
34. In the context of inherent sovereignty, the Court causes confusion by using the
moniker "member" as shorthand for "enrolled member."
35. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). See also Duro 1H, 495 U.S. 676, 685-
86 (1990); Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts,
33 TULSA L.J. 1 (1997).
183
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quently, the circuits split as to whether Indian tribes had been
divested of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians along
with non-Indians.3 6 The Supreme Court in Duro II reversed the
Ninth Circuit by holding that a nonmember Indian's relations
with a tribe are no different than those of a non-Indian. 37 Thus,
Indian tribes were prohibited from intruding on the personal lib-
erties of "nonmember" Indians who by definition did not consent
to the governance of the tribe.3 8
Accordingly, the Court determined that tribal jurisdiction
over crimes involving nonmember Indians - to whom the Bill of
Rights would not apply in Indian country39 - is inconsistent with
equal treatment of nonmember Indian citizens and non-Indians.40
As a result, the Duro II decision created a jurisdictional void in
the Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA).41 While the so-called In-
dian exception in the ICCA had given exclusive jurisdiction to the
tribes over misdemeanor crimes committed by an Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, the holding in Duro II
meant that tribes could no longer prosecute "nonmembers"42
36. Compare Duro 1, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988) with Greywater Y. Joshua, 846 F.2d
486 (8th Cir. 1988). See also Tasso, supra note 24; Owen, supra note 27.
37. Duro 11, 495 U.S. at 688.
38. Id. at 694. See supra note 34. This Article scrutinizes and challenges the Court's
member Indian semantics as unfaithful to federal Indian law's long acceptance of recog-
nized consent.
39. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896); Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d
924, 932 (9th Cir. 2005).
40. Duro H, 495 U.S. at 698. Citizenship was granted to all American Indians in 1924.
See STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 142-43.
41. Eric B. White, Note, Falling Through the Cracks After Duro v. Reina" A Close Look
at a Jurisdictional Failure, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 229, 230 (1991). The ICCA, also
referred to as the Indian General Crimes Act or Federal Enclaves Act, states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall
extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the per-
son or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the
Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case
where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or
may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000). "The Supreme Court has interpreted the exception as manifesting
a broad congressional respect for tribal sovereignty in matters affecting only Indians."
United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Quiver,
241 U.S. 602 (1916)).
42. See supra note 34.
8
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within the Indian exception, and there was no other statute grant-
ing federal jurisdiction to fill the gap.43
Responding to the outcry of the tribes over Duro 11, Congress
immediately enacted temporary legislation to fix the situation cre-
ated by the Court. 44 That legislation, made permanent a year
later, is referred to as the Duro-fiX.45 It amended the definitions
section of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) of 1968 to recognize
and affirm the inherent power of Indian tribes "to exercise crimi-
nal jurisdiction over all Indians," not just member Indians.4
6
III. UNITED STATES V. ROGERS AND ITS PROGENY
Rather than creating a rigid statutory definition of who is an
Indian for purposes of tribal criminal jurisdiction,47 Congress de-
cided in the Duro-fix to endorse the definition as then developed
by courts interpreting federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes
Act.48 The test for who is an Indian can be traced at least as far
43. Although nonmembers were shielded from tribal prosecution the same as non-Indi-
ans for purposes of Duro, they remained Indians and did not fall into the state's jurisdiction
over crimes committed against non-Indians. See, e.g., Means, 432 F.3d at 933-34:
If Means was not subject to prosecution in the Navajo courts, he could not be pros-
ecuted in any court. The state of Arizona, like the majority of states, does not have
jurisdiction to try Indians for offenses committed on a reservation, and there is no
federal court jurisdiction because Means's alleged offenses do not fall within the
Major Crimes Act.
44. Dep't of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat.
1856 (1990) (amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1983)).
45. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646. See, e.g., COHEN'S HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2401-41 (Nell J. Newton et al. eds., 2005 ed.) [hereinafter
NEWTON]; L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising
Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 53, 63 (1994) [hereinafter Gould,
The Congressional Response].
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000); see Means, 432 F.3d at 930 ("'All Indians' plainly includes
Indians who are not enrolled members of the particular tribe exercising jurisdiction" but
not "all persons who may be ethnically Indian.").
47. By one count, there are over thirty-three definitions of Indian status contained in
federal statutes and regulations. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 1481. For an excellent survey
of the most common definitions, see Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who is an Indian? Searching
for an Answer to the Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
275 (2000-2001).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2000) states: "'Indian' means any person who would be subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under section 1153, Title 18, if that
person were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian country to which that
section applies." The Major Crimes Act provides:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnap-
ping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit
murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily in-
jury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual who
9
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back as 1846 to the Supreme Court decision of United States v.
Rogers.49 In that case, the defendant was William S. Rogers, a
white man who established his domicile in Cherokee country and
was adopted and recognized by the tribe as an Indian. 50 Although
Rogers exercised the same rights and privileges as any other
Cherokee citizen, the Court held that the statute at issue, an ear-
lier version of the Major Crimes Act, did not contemplate a white
man of mature age being adopted into an Indian tribe. 51 The
Court stated that Indian as used in the act "does not speak of
members of a tribe, but of the race generally,-of the family of
Indians."52 In addition, the Rogers Court determined that Indian
"is confined to those who by the usages and customs of the Indians
are regarded as belonging to their race."
53
Over the one-hundred-sixty years since Rogers, state and fed-
eral courts have formulated a test of Indian status that involves
two fundamental prongs: (1) the person has Indian blood; and (2)
is recognized as an Indian by the tribe or Indian community.
54
The Rogers test has been developed by application in many differ-
ent state courts and federal circuits, but the Supreme Court has
not explicated the test since its decisions from the late nineteenth
century. 55 This part of the Article outlines and considers the
has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under
section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law
and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and
punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in
which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000).
49. 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
50. Id. at 567-68.
51. Id. at 572-73.
52. Id. at 573.
53. Id.
54. STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 24. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL IN-
DIAN LAW 2 (U.S. Printing Off. 1942, 2d ed., 4th printing 1945) [hereinafter COHEN], availa-
ble at http://madison.law.ou.edu/cohen/ (defining "'Indian' as a person meeting two qualifi-
cations: (a) That some of his ancestors lived in America before its discovery by the white
race, and (b) that the individual is considered an 'Indian' by the community in which he
lives"); accord ELMER F. BENNETT, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 6 (U.S. Printing Off. 1958) [herein-
after BENNETT]; see also NEWTON, supra note 45, at 171-72 (defining "Indian as a person
meeting two qualifications: (a) that some of the individual's ancestors lived in what is now
the United States before its discovery by Europeans, and (b) that the individual is recog-
nized as an Indian by the individual's tribe or community").
55. See United States v. Romero, 136 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding the
Rogers test to be a "complex legal definition of Indian status").
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evolution of the two-pronged test in an attempt to identify com-
mon law principles that were assumed by Congress to be estab-
lished precedent at the time of the Duro-fix.
A. The Blood (or Ancestry) Prong
The blood element of the Indian status test has been contro-
versial due to its link to race.5 6 This requirement has been widely
criticized, particularly within the last decade. 57 Yet this part of
the test has remained a persistent focus in both state and federal
court decisions.
Initially, the federal courts considered a flurry of cases in the
latter half of the nineteenth century involving white men with no
Indian blood who were adopted by various tribes.58 In several of
those cases, the men were found to be Indian because certain trea-
ties at issue either granted amnesty to Indian citizens or provided
specific tribes with jurisdiction over all adopted and naturalized
citizens.5 9 In United States v. Ragsdale, the circuit court in the
district of Arkansas noted that Rogers expressly allowed that "a
white man may incorporate himself with an Indian tribe, be
adopted by it, and become a member of the tribe."60 Because the
Treaty of Washington pardoned all prior crimes committed by
Cherokee citizens, not just by Indians, the court was able to side-
step the Rogers holding that a white man could not be an Indian
for purposes of avoiding federal criminal jurisdiction under the ex-
ceptions in the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act (a precursor to
the ICCA).61 In this fashion, the court declared the white victim in
the case, Richard Newland, to be a Cherokee citizen by adoption,
56. See Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 81-83 (Wyo. 1982) (Rooney, J., concurring); see
generally Valencia-Weber, supra note 30; Frank Shockey, "Invidious"American Indian Tri-
bal Sovereignty: Morton v. Mancari, Contra Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Rice v.
Cayetano, and Other Recent Cases, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 275 (2001); Gould, Mixing Bod-
ies, supra note 30 (noting the unreliability of modern science as a means for quantifying
race); John Rockwell Snowden et al., American Indian Sovereignty and Naturalization: It's
a Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171 (2000-2001); Gould, The Congressional Response, supra
note 45. But see Kim Benita Furumoto & David Theo Goldberg, Boundaries of the Racial
State: Two Faces of Racist Exclusion in United States Law, 17 HARv. BLACKLErrER L.J. 85,
101-09 (2001) ("As a racial presumption, colorblindness continues to conjure people of color
as a problem in virtue of their being of color, in so far as they are not white.").
57. See sources cited supra note 56.
58. See supra notes 49-52, infra notes 60-62, 76-78.
59. See supra notes 49-52, infra notes 60-62, 76-78.
60. United States v. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. 684, 686 (Cir. Ct., D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,113)
(emphasis added).
61. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846).
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which meant the federal court had no criminal jurisdiction accord-
ing to the terms of the treaty. 62
In Ex parte Mayfield, the defendant, accused of committing
adultery, was stipulated to be one-fourth Indian by blood.63 Since
the crime was victimless, federal court jurisdiction hinged on
whether John Mayfield was Indian.64 Similar to Ragsdale, how-
ever, the Supreme Court avoided the question by finding Mayfield
to be an adopted Cherokee member and thus subject under an
1866 treaty to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation.65
In Westmoreland v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that an indictment describing the defendant and deceased as
white persons, was sufficient for maintaining federal jurisdic-
tion.66 The Court, citing Rogers for support, said the term "Indian"
is descriptive of race.67 Therefore, the description of the defendant
and victim as white men was enough to prevent the indictment
from being jurisdictionally defective. 68 The indictment further al-
leged that the defendant and victim were not Indian citizens,69
thus supporting by implication the holding from Rogers, decided
almost fifty years earlier, that the citizenship inquiry is not de-
pendent upon race. 70
In Alberty v. United States, the defendant was an undisputed
citizen of the Cherokee Nation. 71 The Supreme Court, again citing
Rogers, cautioned that such citizenship by itself did not make Al-
berty an Indian under the federal criminal statutes. Absent a pre-
emptive treaty or act of Congress, race remained a key element of
jurisdiction. 72
In Lucas v. United States, the Supreme Court began by ob-
serving that the description of the murdered man in the indict-
ment as a negro and not an Indian "implied that there were ne-
groes who were, and those who were not, Indians, in a jurisdic-
tional sense" under the Act of 1890,73 in which the territory of
Oklahoma provided "that the judicial tribunals of the Indian Na-
62. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. at 686.
63. 141 U.S. 107, 113 (1891).
64. Id. at 111-12.
65. Id. at 112-16.
66. 155 U.S. 545, 548-49 (1895).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 546.
70. Id. at 548 (citing United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846)).
71. 162 U.S. 499, 500 (1896).
72. Id. at 500-01; see infra note 138.
73. 163 U.S. 612, 615 (1896).
188 Vol. 67
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tions shall be allowed to retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil
and criminal cases arising within their country in which members
of the Nation, by nativity or by adoption, shall be the only par-
ties. .... ,,74 On account of this unique Oklahoma statute, the racial
portion of the Rogers test did not apply.
75
Nofire v. United States involved the same treaty and statutory
language that trumped the Rogers test in Alberty.7 6 The murder
victim, Fred Rutherford, was alleged to be a white man and not an
Indian.77 But since no quantum of Indian blood was required for
Cherokee membership, the Court found Rutherford to be an
adopted Cherokee without making further racial inquiry. 78 Nofire
was the last Supreme Court case to consider whether a person
without Indian blood who was adopted as a member of an Indian
tribe could be an Indian under the federal law of criminal jurisdic-
tion.7
9
In the twentieth century, most of the cases defining Indian for
criminal jurisdiction purposes involved basic measurement of In-
dian blood as implied by Rogers. 0 Treaties were not a frequent
consideration, since the federal government ended treaty making
with Indian tribes in 1871.81 In 1912, the Eighth Circuit found
one-eighth Indian blood enough for Indian status.8 2 In Ex parte
Pero, one petitioner was a full-blood and the other had a full-blood
74. Alberty, 162 U.S. at 502 (quoting Treaty with Cherokee Indians, July 19, 1866, art.
13, 14 Stat. 803). This quoted language of the Treaty was followed in the Act of 1890. Id. at
502-03.
75. Lucas, 163 U.S. at 616.
76. Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897).
77. Id. at 658.
78. Id. at 658, 661-62.
79. The Montana Supreme Court considered the issue of non-racial Indian status in
State v. Montana Ninth Jud. Dist. Ct., 257 Mont. 512, 851 P.2d 405 (1993).
80. Shortly after the Indian Rights Act was passed in 1934, the BIA was charged with
devising a method:
to certify individuals who claimed to be half-blood Indian. The Bureau based its
determination on five factors: 1) tribal rolls; 2) testimony of the applicant; 3) affi-
davits from people familiar with the applicant; 4) findings of an anthropologist;
and 5) testimony of the applicant that he has retained "a considerable measure of
Indian culture and habits of living." As explained in a 1936 memo written by Col-
lier, "Determination of the degree of Indian blood is entirely dependent on circum-
stantial evidence; there is no known sure or scientific proof. Nor has any legal
standard of universal applicability been set up by statute for the determination of
who is, and who is not, an Indian."
Brownell, supra note 47, at 288.
81. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
82. Sully v. United States, 195 F. 113, 117 (8th Cir. 1912). The Eighth Circuit also held
that one-quarter to three-eighths Indian blood was sufficient. Venzina v. United States,
245 F. 411, 420 (1917). But see Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982) (holding
13
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mother and a half-blood father; a sufficient indication of Indian
race in each instance.8 3 In 1968, the Washington Supreme Court
concluded that "since 1846 - and perhaps earlier" the legal test for
Indian status involved a "substantial percentage of Indian
blood."84 In 1974, The Arizona Supreme Court assumed, without
deciding, that a defendant had a substantial percentage of Indian
blood if his father was half-Indian.85 The court, however, cited a
California Supreme Court opinion cautioning that a significant
blood quantum is not dispositive of Indian status because of the
possibility that the individual has been emancipated (or assimi-
lated) and thus should be treated like any non-Indian.8 6
In 1976, the Eighth Circuit held that one-fourth Indian by
blood is enough to satisfy the first prong of the Rogers test.8 7 That
same year, the Fourth Circuit had no difficulty declaring three-
fourths degree of blood to be sufficient.88 In 1982, the Wyoming
Supreme Court, in a parsimonious application of the blood prong,
held that one-eighth Indian blood is too little for Indian status.8 9
The court supported its conclusion by employing the "substantial
amount of Indian blood" terminology from Ex parte Pero and
resorting to a strict dictionary definition for the meaning of sub-
stantial.90 Justice Brown, writing for the court, praised Professor
Robert Clinton's classic article on Indian criminal jurisdiction, but
seemingly ignored that scholar's synthesis of the Indian status
test and the conclusion that it merely requires "some demonstra-
ble biological identification as an Indian."91 A few months later, in
Goforth v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held
that slightly less than one-quarter Indian blood was a significant
percentage. 92
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Torres, determined
that both 25/64 degree Indian blood and 11/32 degree of Indian
blood indicated "some degree of Indian blood" under the Rogers
one-eighth Indian blood is not a "substantial amount of Indian blood" to classify a defen-
dant in a criminal case as Indian).
83. 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938).
84. Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 440 P.2d 442, 444 (Wash. 1968).
85. State v. Attebery, 519 P.2d 53, 54 (Ariz. 1974).
86. Id. at 54 (citing People v. Carmen, 273 P.2d 521, 525 (Cal. 1954)).
87. United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786-87 (8th Cir. 1976).
88. United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976).
89. Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 79 (referring to Robert Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A
Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 503, 520 (1976)).
92. 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
Vol. 67
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test.93 In 1988, the Idaho Court of Appeals declined to decide
whether 15/64 Indian blood degree was significant, because the
defendant did not pass the recognition prong of the two-element
test.94 Four months later, the district court in South Dakota con-
cluded that 15/32 Indian blood was sufficient for the Rogers test.
95
This same court held in another case that 7/32 Indian blood meets
the Rogers criterion of "some Indian blood," notwithstanding one
of the defendant's parents being a non-Indian.
9 6
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Montana found that 165/512 of
Indian blood was significant.97 Later that year, the Utah Court of
Appeals opined "five-sixteenths Indian blood clearly qualifies as a
'significant percentage,' the historical debate treated in the cases
focusing on whether two-sixteenths is enough."9 8 The court fur-
ther noted that the blood requirement of the Indian status test is
more rigid than the recognition requirement. 99 In 1993, the Mon-
tana high court heard the case of a defendant, Don Juneau, who
had no Indian blood but had an Indian father by adoption. 100 Be-
cause the court concluded that Juneau was not recognized by a
tribe, it did not think it necessary to address the blood prong of the
Rogers test, but noted the argument that the prong is inconsistent
with the modern notion of being Indian as a political status rather
than a racial classification. 10 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in
1995, affirmed the South Dakota federal district court's finding,
under the recognition prong, that defendant was a non-Indian,
and affirmed without review that 11/128 Indian blood would sat-
isfy the Rogers inquiry.10 2 And, in 1996, the Ninth Circuit agreed
that one-quarter Indian blood is a degree of blood that satisfies
the Rogers test.10 3
In a notable early decision of the twenty-first century regard-
ing Indian status for criminal jurisdiction, the Washington Court
of Appeals held that a defendant conceded to be a descendant and
member of the Sturgeon Lake First Nation, a Canadian Indian
93. 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984).
94. State v. Bonaparte, 759 P.2d 83, 85 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
95. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D. 1
96. United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D.S.D. 1991).
97. State v. LaPier, 242 Mont. 335, 341-42, 790 P.2d 983 (1990) [
98. State v. Hagen, 802 P.2d 745, 748 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
99. Id.
100. State v. Montana Ninth Jud. Dist. Ct., 257 Mont. 512, 515
(1993).
101. Id. at 516-17, 851 P.2d at 407-08.
102. United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1995).
103. United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996).
988).
hereinafter LaPier 11.
851 P.2d 405, 407
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tribe, was clearly established as an Indian under the first Rogers
prong.'0 4 Also in 2001, the Tenth Circuit held that evidence of In-
dian membership by itself is not evidence of blood sufficient to
meet the first prong of Rogers.'05 The following year, in a case
before the Idaho Court of Appeals, the parties agreed that a signif-
icant percentage of blood was present in a defendant whose
mother was a full-blooded Indian and whose father was an Afri-
can-American.,
0 6
Judge Quackenbush, in a 2004 memorandum opinion for the
Federal District Court of the Eastern District of Washington,
found that "The maximum Indian blood possessed by Duane
Garvais in any federally recognized Indian Tribe is 1/16th Koote-
nai and 1/16th Colville,"107 seemingly implying that blood is forti-
fied by maximizing the blood quantum from a particular tribe.' 08
Garvais' blood degree in other recognized tribes was 1/32 Yankton
Sioux and 1/32 Santee Sioux, for a total blood quantum of 3/16,
much less than the "documented blood degree of 5/8" he had
claimed on his application for BIA employment.10 9 Moreover, the
court took the position that a limited blood quantum weighed
heavily against a determination of Indian status when the recog-
nition prong of the Rogers test was tenuous. 110
In United States v. Bruce, a Montana district court joined the
Eighth Circuit in concluding that one-eighth blood is enough to
satisfy the first prong."' On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that
"[blecause the general requirement is only of 'some' blood, evi-
dence of a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent who is
clearly identified as an Indian is generally sufficient to satisfy this
prong."112 Judge Rymer, in dissent, argued that the Rogers test
requirement of "some" blood is not enough. 113 According to Judge
Rymer, the quantum of blood must be at the level required by each
tribe for enrollment. 114 Under this theory, the dissent implied that
104. State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
105. United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2001).
106. Lewis v. State, 55 P.3d 875, 876, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).
107. In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223 (E.D. Wash. 2004).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1221-22.
110. Id. at 1225.
111. 394 F.3d 1215, 1223-26 (9th Cir. 2005).
112. Id. at 1223.
113. Id. at 1235 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1235 n.6 ("Whether or not one-eighth blood is sufficient in some cases, there
is no evidence in this case that it would suffice for purposes of membership in, or identifica-
tion with, any relevant tribe.").
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an individual must share the same bloodline as the recognizing
tribe. 115
B. The Recognition Prong
A significant quantum of scholarly ink has been spilled criti-
cizing the "vampire" prong of the Rogers test.11 6 Yet only cursory
review has been given to the recognition prong.11 7 This section of
the Article identifies many overlapping types of fact patterns,
showcases factors that courts have considered when assessing the
second prong of the Rogers test, and illuminates various methods
adopted by courts in construing the meaning of recognition. Then,
in Part IV, this Article analyzes the original meaning of the recog-
nition prong and the implication of the Duro-fix policy as a return
to a culturally relevant," 8 socio-political method of recognition.
1. Formal'19 Recognition by an Indian Tribe or the Federal
Government
a) Membership in Tribe Asserting Jurisdiction
As mentioned in Part III.A., many cases heard by the Su-
preme Court in the late nineteenth century involved individuals
who were ancestrally non-Indian, yet considered to be members of
Indian tribes by adoption.120 The Court made clear that those in-
dividuals, though not "racially" Indian as required for criminal ju-
risdiction under the Rogers test, were recognized, nonetheless, as
115. Id.
116. See supra note 56.
117. COHEN, supra note 54, at 2-5; Clinton, supra note 91, at 513-20 (analyzing recogni-
tion prong); see generally Bethany R. Berger, "Power over this Unfortunate Race": Race,
Politics, and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004);
Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts: Applying the Myths and the Methods
of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts' Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARiz. ST. L.J. 77, 111-16
(2004); Christine Metteer, The Trust Doctrine, Sovereignty, and Membership: Determining
Who Is Indian, 5 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 53 (2003); Snowden et al., supra note 56; Brown-
ell, supra note 47; Eric Henderson, Ancestry and Casino Dollars in the Formation of Tribal
Identity, 4 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 7 (1998); Gould, The Congressional Response, supra
note 45; Dussias, supra note 25.
118. William C. Wantland, An Essay: The Ignorance of Ignorance: Cultural Barriers Be-
tween Indians and Non-Indians, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1 (1975) ("Indians who live in a
dominant non-Indian society find it necessary to live in two cultures, that is, we have to be
bicultural.").
119. The terms "formal" and "informal" are subjective. The placement of the following
cases is therefore meant to facilitate fact pattern comparisons and further analysis.
120. See supra notes 49-53, 71-78.
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Indian citizens. 121 It was further suggested by the Rogers court
that Indian status is regarded from the Indian race viewpoint.122
Recognition as an Indian depended on the usages and customs of
all Indians.1 23 In other words, pan-Indian culture was the stan-
dard by which Indian recognition was to be measured. Once recog-
nized, an Indian would be governed by the usages and customs of
their own tribe and other tribes.1
24
i) Recognized as an Indian
Chief Justice Taney noted that William S. Rogers had, in fact,
become a formally recognized member of the Cherokee tribe. 125 He
had voluntarily moved to Cherokee country with the intent of
making it his permanent home and had "incorporated himself
with the said tribe of Indians as one of them, and was so treated,
recognized, and adopted by the said tribe, and the proper authori-
ties thereof, and exercised all the rights and privileges of a Chero-
kee Indian."1 26 But for Roger's lack of Indian blood, he would have
been deemed Indian.
Similarly, in Ragsdale, Judge Johnson stated that, under
Cherokee laws and usages, Richard Newland was recognized as a
citizen of the tribe. 127 Moreover, by his marriage to a Cherokee
woman, he was "entitled to all the rights and privileges, civil and
political, which belonged to any other citizen of the [Cherokee] Na-
tion." 128 Nearly fifty years later, however, the Supreme Court
found that marriage to a freed African-American woman who was
a Cherokee citizen did not confer the right to vote or other privi-
leges of Cherokee citizenship on Phil Duncan.1 29 Apparently, a
Cherokee woman by blood could confer citizenship by marriage,
but a non-Indian Cherokee citizen could not.130 The district court
next noted indications that the United States government also
121. See supra notes 49-53, 71-78.
122. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 572.
126. Id. at 571.
127. United States v. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. 684, 685 (C.C.D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,113).
128. Id.
129. Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 501 (1896).
130. See also Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657, 658, 662 (1897); Boffv. Burney, 168
U.S. 218, 223 (1897); Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76, 78-79, 95 (1906) (holding that
marrying a Cherokee Indian by blood prior to 1875 resulted in entitlement to similar citi-
zenship per capita rights as Cherokee Indians by blood, but with other limitations).
194 Vol. 67
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recognized Newland's Indian status.131 Based on his Cherokee
membership, Newland had received "transportation money, ra-
tions, and a year's subsistence" from the United States govern-
ment three years after his marriage when the Cherokees were re-
moved to west of the Mississippi.
132
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in the 1893 State v. Campbell
case, considered an act of adultery committed within the exterior
boundaries of the White Earth Reservation. 133 One defendant,
John Belonge, was determined by the court to be an Indian be-
cause he lived on the reservation, retained his tribal relations, re-
ceived annuities from the United States government, and was
under the supervision of a government agent. 134 Justice Mitchell
noted that the tribe "still retained [its] tribal organization, and
w[as] under the care and supervision of the federal govern-
ment."' 3
5
In Nofire, Justice Brewer explained that white men who were
married to Cherokee women were adopted citizens while living in
Cherokee country, according to Cherokee law.' 36 The Court found
that Fred Rutherford not only fit those criteria, but also identified
himself as a citizen, voted in a Cherokee election, continued to
hold himself out as a Cherokee citizen and was recognized as a
citizen by the tribe. 37 Although, under treaties and acts involving
the Cherokee Nation, 38 Rutherford was held to be within the ju-
risdiction of Cherokee Nation courts, his lack of Indian ancestry
prevented him from being an Indian under the Rogers test. 39
In 1933, the Montana Attorney General argued that Bud
Phelps, convicted of stealing cattle on the Crow Indian Reserva-
tion, was not an Indian under the "two elements in the test by
which it is determined that an accused is within the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the courts of the United States; (1) He must be an
Indian, that is, of some degree of Indian blood, and (2) he must not
131. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. at 685.
132. Id.
133. 55 N.W. 553, 553 (Minn. 1893).
134. Id. at 553-54.
135. Id. at 553.
136. 164 U.S. 657, 658 (1897).
137. Id. at 660-62.
138. See Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 502 (citing Cherokee treaty of 1866 and
the Act of May 2, 1890, which affirmed Cherokee court jurisdiction in all cases involving
only "members of the Nation, by nativity or by adoption").
139. Compare Nofire, 164 U.S. at 662, with Alberty, 162 U.S. at 500-01 (Because Alberty
had no Indian blood, the 1866 treaty with the Cherokee Nation could not prevent his non-
Indian status resulting from the Rogers holding.).
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have been emancipated."140 The court, however, held that Mr.
Phelps was by law an Indian because he was listed on a Crow In-
dian tribe membership roll approved by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, and he had received annuities and a trust patent of a thou-
sand acres of allotted land. Therefore, Justice Matthews deter-
mined that the defendant continued to be "recognized by the tribe
and by the government authorities as of the Indian race."
141
Ex parte Pero142 is a frequently cited case from the Seventh
Circuit decided nearly one hundred years after Rogers. In analyz-
ing the question of who is an Indian for purposes of federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction, Judge Treanor cited Rogers for the proposition
that Indian usages and customs define Indian status.143 As to pe-
titioner, Jerry Pero, a full-blooded Indian, the court found his re-
ceipt of allotted lands was not in fee-simple, but was either by
means of a trust patent or a patent in fee with restrictions. 144 The
court thus held that Pero remained under federal guardianship as
an Indian ward of the United States and, contrary to the conten-
tion of the warden of the Wisconsin State Prison, had not been
emancipated from his tribal bonds.
145
In 1959, the Washington Supreme Court granted a writ of
habeas corpus to Agnes Monroe, an enrolled member of the Black-
foot-Cree tribe who pled guilty to being an accomplice in the com-
mission of grand larceny on the Yakama Indian Reservation. 146 In
support of Monroe's Indian status, Justice Weaver noted that she
had maintained her tribal relations.
147
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Lossiah, held that
there was sufficient evidence to prove Indian status for purposes
of federal jurisdiction when the defendant had three-quarters
Eastern Cherokee blood and there was a "certificate of the Tribal
Enrollment Officer of the Eastern band of Cherokee Indians that
defendant is on Revised Roll No. 3902."148
In United States v. Antelope, the United States Supreme
Court noted that defendants were "enrolled members of the Coeur
140. Brief for Appellant, State v. Phelps, 93 Mont. 277, 19 P.2d 319 (1933) (No. 7,037).
141. Phelps, 93 Mont. at 288, 19 P.2d at 321.
142. 99 F.2d 28 (1938).
143. Id. at 30.
144. Id. at 35.
145. Id.
146. In re Monroe, 346 P.2d 667, 667 (Wash. 1959).
147. Id.
148. 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976).
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d'Alene Tribe and thus not emancipated from tribal relations."
149
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous court, declined to
say whether nonenrolled Indians have Indian status under the
Major Crimes Act, but did note Ex parte Pero's holding that enroll-
ment in a recognized tribe is not a sine qua non for federal juris-
diction, "at least where the Indian defendant lived on the reserva-
tion and 'maintained tribal relations with the Indians
thereon."' 150 In United States v. Broncheau, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Major Crimes Act does not require an indictment alleging
the Indian to be enrolled. 151 Judge Blaine Anderson cited Ex parte
Pero and Cohen's 1942 Handbook, among other sources, to sup-
port an understanding that "[elnrollment is the common eviden-
tiary means of establishing Indian status, but it is not the only
means nor is it necessarily determinative."
15 2
In a matter involving two enrolled members of the Me-
nominee Indian Tribe, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals remanded
the case to the lower court with instructions for deciding whether
Bernard Smith, the party who lived off of the reservation, was a
non-Indian. 53 First, the court stated that status as a citizen of a
state does not preclude status as an Indian. 54 Next, the court fol-
lowed the totality of circumstances approach from State v. Allan,
and mentioned several factors - habits, racial status, and lifestyle
- noting that "place of residence could be important evidence of
whether Smith has adopted a non-Indian lifestyle." 55 Finally,
Judge Cane observed that "the federal policy of promoting Indian
self-government is clearest when all components of a transaction
are reservation-based." 56
In Torres, the Seventh Circuit held that certificates of tribal
enrollment and evidence of dividend payments from the Me-
nominee Tribal Enterprises exclusively to the enrolled members of
the Tribe were sufficient, along with evidence of some blood, to
support a jury finding of Indian status. 57 The court also approved
the following jury instruction:
149. 430 U.S. 641, 647 n.7 (1977).
150. Id. (citing Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (7th Cir. 1938)).
151. 597 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1979).
152. Id. ("[E]nrollment has not yet been held to be an absolute requirement of federal
jurisdiction .... Nor should it be.").
153. Sanapaw v. Smith, 335 N.W.2d 425, 426 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
154. Id. at 429.
155. Id. at 430, see infra notes 166-71.
156. Id. at 431.
157. 733 F.2d 449, 455-56 (7th Cir. 1984).
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To be considered an Indian, a person must have some degree of In-
dian blood, and must be recognized as an Indian. In considering
whether a person is recognized as an Indian, you may consider such
factors, whether a person is recognized as an Indian by an Indian
tribe, or society of Indians. Whether a person is recognized as an
Indian by the federal government, whether a person resides on an
Indian reservation, and whether a person holds himself out as an
Indian. It is not necessary that all of these factors be present, rather
you as jurors must consider the totality of the circumstances in de-
termining as a factual matter whether each defendant is an In-
dian. 15
8
ii) Not Recognized as an Indian
In 1921, the Ninth Circuit, in Louie v. United States, deter-
mined that a member of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Indians, who
had received funds disbursed to tribal members, was a non-Indian
because he held a patent in fee to land within the reservation and
had been declared competent by an agent of the Department of
Indian Affairs. 159 Judge Hunt, writing for the majority, reasoned
that Congress, by expressly making fee-simple patent allottees
subject to state law, "in a sense, abandoned its guardianship of
Louie and has left him subject to all the privileges and burdens of
one sui juris."160 The court indicated that the General Allotment
Act was a "radical departure" from prevailing Indian policy, but
decided that such intent was made clear by the language of the
statute. 16
1
158. Id. at 456.
159. 274 F. 47, 48, 51 (9th Cir. 1921).
160. Id. at 51.
161. Id. The United States Supreme Court, in examining the General Allotment Act
(Dawes Act), opined that "[c]itizenship is not incompatible with tribal existence or contin-
ued guardianship, and so may be conferred without completely emancipating the Indians,
or placing them beyond the reach of congressional regulations adopted for their protection,"
but held that "the dissolution of the tribal relation was in contemplation" after the title to
the land was no longer held by the United States in trust. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S.
591, 598-99 (1916). See also State v. Columbia George, 65 P. 604, 609-10 (Or. 1901):
The intendment of the latter clause is not so clear, but if it be conceded that the
purpose therefor[e] is to extend citizenship by the mere act of allotment, without
requiring of the allottees the adoption of the habits of civilized life, - about which
there is some doubt, - the federal courts seem to have considered that such citi-
zenship is not inconsistent with the continuation of tribal existence, relations, and
affiliations. * ** It would seem, therefore, that citizenship, such as extends within
the purview of the Daws [sic] act to Indian allottees, is neither inconsistent nor
incompatible with the status of a tribal Indian; that the government, while it has
bestowed citizenship, has not thereby relinquished the guardianship of the
tribes....
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In 1929, the Montana Supreme Court considered the case of
Louis Monroe, who had been born a member of the Blackfeet tribe
and had been a police officer on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation
for ten or fifteen years. 162 The court held that Monroe was a citi-
zen of Montana, however, and accountable to its laws because he
had been allotted patent in fee land under the 1877 Dawes Act.
163
Chief Justice Callaway wrote that Monroe had lost his Indian sta-
tus and now "stood in the shoes of a white man" - the "color line
ha[ving] faded out."' 64 And, in 1954, the California Supreme
Court decided that Indian status is lost, for example, if an ethnic
Indian takes on "civilized habits" and severs tribal relations or if
the individual receives "a conveyance of allotted lands by patent in
fee from the federal government."
165
b) Nonmembership in Tribe Asserting Jurisdiction
i) Recognized as an Indian
In Allan, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an enrolled
member of one tribe is not emancipated merely by virtue of resid-
ing on the reservation of a different tribe. 166 Ralph Joseph Allan
was an enrolled member of the federally recognized Quinault
Tribe of Indians. 67 He had a share of an allotment on the
Quinault Reservation, but was living on the Coeur d'Alene Indian
Reservation when he allegedly bribed a deputy sheriff of Kootenai
County.' 68 Chief Justice Donaldson, writing for a unanimous
court, applied the totality of the circumstances approach to the
recognition prong, as synthesized from case law by Professor Clin-
ton, and decided that "Allan ha[d] not severed his relations with
the Quinault Tribe.' 69 In a detailed concurring opinion, Justice
McFadden noted that "[tihe cases uniformly regard this factual
issue [i.e. living off of the reservation, and taking up a non-Indian
lifestyle] as pertinent, despite the fact that the reservation system
itself imposed a non-Indian lifestyle on many tribes."' 70 But where
a person maintained tribal relations with any federally recognized
162. State v. Monroe, 83 Mont. 556, 274 P. 840, 841 (1929).
163. Id., 274 P. at 843.
164. Id., 274 P. at 843.
165. People v. Carmen, 273 P.2d 521, 525 (Cal. 1954).
166. State v. Allan, 607 P.2d 426, 429 (Idaho 1980).
167. Id. at 428.
168. Id. at 427-28.
169. Id. at 428-29.
170. Id. at 433 n.2 (McFadden, J., specially concurring).
199
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Indian tribe, Justice McFadden found a multitude of cases holding
the individual to be an Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction
as a nonmember Indian guest on another reservation. 171
ii) Not Recognized as an Indian
Mary Campbell, a defendant in Campbell before the Minne-
sota Supreme Court, was raised on a farm outside the reservation
by her white father and an Indian mother "who did not sustain
any tribal relations."1 72 Campbell married a white man and con-
tinued to live in Pine County up until a short time before she com-
mitted adultery. 173 The court said without a doubt she was a not a
"tribal Indian," even though she had collected one annuity pay-
ment as an Indian after moving to the White Earth Reserva-
tion.174
In United States v. Heath, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the federal court had jurisdiction under the Major Crimes
Act over a defendant who was stipulated to be an Indian member
of the terminated Kiamath Tribe of Indians. 175 The language of
the Klamath Termination Act related specifically to membership
in the tribe and provided that "all statutes of the United States
which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no
longer be applicable to the members of the tribe."176 The court de-
cided that terminated Klamath Indians were obviously anthropo-
logically Indian but were no longer afforded Indian status.177
Judge Jameson, writing for the court, did not address whether the
defendant, Betty Jean Heath, might have regained Indian status
by becoming an informal member of another tribe - perhaps the
Warm Springs Indian Tribe where the act of voluntary man-
slaughter was committed.' 78
171. Id. at 432-33. See also United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 785-87 (8th Cir. 1976)
(recognizing Williams as enrolled nonmember Indian); Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d
924, 935 (9th Cir. 2005).
172. State v. Campbell, 55 N.W. 553, 554 (Minn. 1893).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 509 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1974).
176. Id. at 19.
177. Id.; see also Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 934 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Antelope
suggests that Indians 'emancipated from tribal relations' or whose tribes have been termi-
nated are not subject to the Major Crimes Act even if they are 'racially to be classified as
'Indians."").
178. Heath, 509 F.2d at 17; Clinton, supra note 91, at 518 n.75. Cf. Means, 432 F.3d at
934 (deciding not to consider whether Mancari political status would apply if defendant
"had been expelled from or had voluntarily and formally withdrawn from his tribe").
200 Vol. 67
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In Lapier v. McCormick (LaPier II), a Ninth Circuit panel con-
sisting of Judges Wright, Fletcher, and Canby, affirmed a non-In-
dian status determination of a lower court, but embraced a differ-
ent analytical framework. 179 The court introduced a "threshold
question" that must be answered "yes" to proceed to the recogni-
tion prong: is the Indian tribe with which an individual claims an
affiliation acknowledged by the federal government?180 LaPier did
not pass the threshold because he only alleged an affiliation with
the Little Shell Band of Landless Chippewa Indians of Montana, a
tribe not federally recognized.18' However, the court did not fore-
close the argument that LaPier might have claimed an affiliation
with the Blackfeet Tribe - on whose reservation the crime oc-
curred - even though he did not have any ancestors from that
tribe. 8 2 Such an approach would treat the Rogers prongs as inde-
pendent; in other words, blood need not be from the recognizing
tribe.
2. Informal Recognition via Significant Contacts
a) Informal Membership in Tribe Asserting Jurisdiction
i) Recognized as an Indian
In Famous Smith, the victim, James Gentry, was found by the
Supreme Court to be an Indian. 8 3 First, Justice Brown noted that
Gentry had held himself out to be a Cherokee Indian and was so
recognized in general.' 8 4 The Court further noted Gentry moved to
the Cherokee Nation after living in the Choctaw Nation. 8 5 Al-
though it is apparent that Gentry was not an enrolled member of
the tribe, the Court considered that his father "was recognized as
an Indian, and appears to have been enrolled and participated in
the payment of 'bread money' to the Cherokees."' 8 6 The evidence
cited in opposition to the Indian claim was that Gentry had not
been permitted to vote in a Cherokee Nation election and he had
179. 986 F.2d 303, 304 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter LaPier III.
180. Id. at 304-05. See State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 24 n.28 (Conn. 1997) (noting list
of "Indian tribal entities that have a government-to-government relationship with the
United States" was first published by the BIA in 1979).
181. LaPier 11, 986 F.2d at 306.
182. Id. at 306 n.5.
183. Smith v. United States, 141 U.S. 50, 56 (1894) [hereinafter Famous Smith].
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lived for an unspecified amount of time outside of Indian coun-
try. 8 7 Any negative inferences based on the voting eligibility,
however, were dismissed by the Court because Gentry had not yet
fulfilled the six-month residency requirement for voting privi-
leges.188 Moreover, one of the election judges had expressed confi-
dence that Gentry was a [Cherokee] Indian; the implication being
that he was also a citizen of the Nation, since only citizens were
allowed to vote.18 9 Finally, the Court discussed the effect of Gen-
try having lived for some time as a resident of the state of Arkan-
sas. 190 There was no evidence of "how he came to live there, under
what circumstances, or how long he lived there;" factors the Court
said had the tendency of pointing to non-Indian status-either of
one who was always a non-Indian or one who had severed his ties
to any tribe.' 91 The Court held that a person who is an Indian does
not lose that status due to temporary residence outside of Indian
country when there is no indication of intent to sever the tribal
affiliation and the tribe still exists and is recognized by the federal
government. 192
Moore, the other petitioner in Ex parte Pero, had his domicile
on the Bad River Indian Reservation and actively associated with
the reservation Indians, but "had not been enrolled with any In-
dian tribe or on any reservation."1 93 In Moore's case, the court
held that non-enrollment did not bar Indian status. 194 Judge
Treanor cited two Eighth Circuit cases and an Indiana case in
support of this holding. 195 In dicta, the court stated that enroll-
ment does serve as evidence of Indian status.196 The court con-
cluded that Moore was an Indian because he was recognized as an
Indian and his full-blood mother, half-blood father, and relatives
resided on the reservation and were recognized as Indians by
other Indians. 19
7
187. Id. at 54-55.
188. Id. at 54.
189. Famous Smith, 141 U.S. at 55.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)); see United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d
16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974) (regarding termination of Indian tribe).
193. Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (1938) (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 31.
195. Vezina v. United States, 245 F.411 (8th Cir. 1917); Sully v. United States, 195 F.
113 (C.C.S.D.S.D. 1912); Doe ex dem. LaFontaine v. Avalina, 8 Ind. 6 (1856).
196. Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 32.
197. Id. at 30-31.
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More than one-hundred-forty years after Rogers, a federal dis-
trict court in South Dakota redefined the Rogers test by submit-
ting what are now referred to as the St. Cloud factors.198 While
the St. Cloud factors have been cited on a relatively frequent basis
since being published in 1988,199 only one other court mentioned
the factors prior to the enactment of the Duro-fiX.20 0 According to
Chief Judge Donald J. Porter:
In declining order of importance, these factors are:
1) enrollment in a tribe;
2) government recognition formally and informally through pro-
viding the person assistance reserved only to Indians;
3) enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and
4) social recognition as an Indian through living on a reserva-
tion and participating in Indian social life.
These factors do not establish a precise formula for determining
who is an Indian. Rather, they merely guide the analysis of whether
a person is recognized as an Indian.
20 1
Richard St. Cloud was an enrolled member of a terminated
tribe20 2 - the Ponca Indian Tribe.20 3 St. Cloud moved to the Lower
Brule Sioux Indian Reservation, married an enrolled member of
that tribe, and had children who were tribal members. 20 4 After
living on the reservation for ten years, he applied for enrollment,
but was denied because the Yankton Sioux Tribe's constitution
prohibited "[persons who are enrolled with another Tribe of Indi-
ans and who have shared as members in allotments of land/or
payments, excluding inherited interests, from any other tribe."
20 5
Because he was not an enrolled member of the Yankton Sioux
198. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988).
199. See, e.g., LaPier 1, 242 Mont. 335, 340-41, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (1990); State v. Hagen,
802 P.2d 745, 748 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 888-
89 (D.S.D. 1991); State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 933 (Utah 1992); United States v. Law-
rence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1995); People v. Bowen, Nos. 185415, 189441, 1996 WL
33357554, at *1 (Mich. App. Ct. 1996); State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 24 (Conn. 1997)
("The four factors enumerated in St. Cloud have emerged as a widely accepted test for
Indian status in the federal courts."); State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650, 653-54 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001); see also United States v. Drewry, 365 F.3d 957, 961 (10th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005).
200. LaPier 1, 242 Mont. at 340-41, 790 P.2d at 986.
201. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
202. AMERICAN INDIAN LAw DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at 52 (discussing termination);
STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 811 (discussing termination).
203. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1458.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1458 n.6.
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Tribe, St. Cloud could not vote in tribal elections and was not
given a higher priority in tribal employment programs.20 6
Applying its recognition prong factor analysis, the court first
stated that enrollment in this case was not determinative of In-
dian status.20 7 The effect of termination was not explicitly in-
cluded in the factor analysis, rather it was intended to be a sepa-
rate inquiry.208 Under the government recognition factor, the
court noted that St. Cloud, as a terminated Indian, did not receive
general assistance benefits. 20 9 Moreover, the court discounted
benefits, such as federal housing assistance, that St. Cloud had
received as a non-Indian living on the reservation while married
to an Indian.210 Next, the court determined that St. Cloud had en-
joyed the benefits of tribal affiliation through some job assistance,
tribal counseling and alcohol treatment programs. 21' Social recog-
nition as an Indian was the final factor considered by the court. 21 2
Here, Judge Porter found St. Cloud to be "a member of the Indian
community;" a "participa[nt] in Indian social life;" and a self-iden-
tified Indian. The fact that St. Cloud was "not at all integrated
into non-Indian society" seems to have been viewed as a positive
attribute of Indian status for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. 21 3
Based on its factor analysis, the St. Cloud court concluded
that the defendant had a "sufficient non-racial link" to the tribe -
presumably the Yankton Sioux Indian Tribe.214 However, due to
the termination of the Ponca Tribe and the fact that St. Cloud's
name was listed on the roll of that tribe, the court surmised that
the trust relationship between the federal government and St.
Cloud had been terminated.215 In support of that proposition,
Judge Porter cited Heath, the only court at that time to have con-
sidered the issue, and dicta from Antelope.21 6 The court did not
consider the possibility of Indian status resulting from St. Cloud's
informal membership in the Yankton Sioux tribe, and the tribe
did not intervene on his behalf.
206. Id. at 1458.
207. Id. at 1461.
208. Id. at 1461 n.10.
209. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
210. Id. at 1462.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.; see also Wantland, supra note 118, at 4-5.
214. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461-62.
215. Id. at 1464-65.
216. Id. at 1464.
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In Duro v. Reina (Duro I), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
did not cite St. Cloud. Instead, the court applied the totality of the
circumstances approach to the recognition prong.217 Albert Duro
was an enrolled member of the Torrez-Martinez band of Mission
Indians and had lived one year on that tribe's reservation.2 18 For
three-and-one-half months, Duro lived on the Salt River Indian
Reservation, during which time he was alleged to have discharged
a firearm - a misdemeanor. 219 The shot killed an enrolled member
Indian of the Gila River Indian Tribe. 220 The Ninth Circuit held
that "extending tribal court criminal jurisdiction to nonmember
Indians who have significant contacts with a reservation does not
amount to a racial classification." 221 In Duro I, the relevant con-
tacts were that "[h]e was closely associated with the [Salt River
Pima-Maricopa Indian] Community through his girlfriend, a Com-
munity member, his residence with her family on the Reservation,
and his employment with the [Tribe's] PiCopa Construction Com-
pany."2
22
In United States v. Drewry, the Tenth Circuit adopted the St.
Cloud factors in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a
jury finding of guilt on four counts of child abuse.223 The court
found that the United States had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the tribe recognized the children as Indians.224 As to
the first factor, tribal enrollment, Judge Seymour noticed that the
children were officially enrolled in the Comanche Tribe, but that
two of the alleged acts had occurred prior to enrollment. 225 In-
stead of relying on the enrollment factor, the court found evidence
sufficient to satisfy a finding of Indian status under the other St.
Cloud factors. 226 The supporting evidence was as follows: Indian
Medical Services provided health care to the children based on an
Indian classification; the Comanche tribal chairman had directed
that the children be admitted to a summer camp for Comanche
children only and had vouched for their status as Comanches; the
children attended pow-wows; and, the Tribe's Indian Child Wel-
217. Duro 1, 851 F.2d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1988).
218. Id. at 1138.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1145.
222. Id. at 1144. The PiCopa Construction Company was not restricted to members of
the Community. Id. at 1138.
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fare Office had taken custody of the children on the basis of their
eligibility as Comanches.
227
In Bruce, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed
the United States District Court for the District of Montana which
had relied on both the lack of enrollment and federal government
recognition in determining that Violet Bruce had not met her bur-
den of producing sufficient evidence of her Indian status.228 Judge
Bybee, writing for the majority, held that the second prong of the
Rogers test does not mandate federal recognition. 229 Citing United
States v. Keys, Lewis v. State, and Ex parte Pero for support, the
majority affirmed the possibility of informal membership in a
tribe.230 The court found "strong evidence of tribal recognition" in
that Bruce was born and resided on the Fort Peck Indian Reserva-
tion; she had participated in Indian ceremonies - for example, a
sweat lodge ritual; she had received medical care at Poplar Indian
Health Services and at the Spotted Bull Treatment Center on sev-
eral occasions; two of her children were enrolled tribal members;
and, most significantly, according to the majority, she had been
arrested numerous times and treated as an Indian by tribal au-
thorities. 2
31
Judge Rymer dissented in Bruce "because until now, no one
has ever held that an adult may be an Indian (for purposes of legal
status, not for purposes of ethnicity) when she is neither enrolled
as a member of a tribe nor eligible for membership, nor entitled to
tribal or government benefits to which only Indians are enti-
tled."232 The dissent described enrollment as the "common thread"
of Indian status.233 Judge Rymer did not think that Bruce's con-
227. Id.; cf. United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150 (8th Cir. 1995).
228. 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (2005).
229. Id. at 1225.
230. Id. at 1224-25 (citing State v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); Lewis v.
State, 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); Exparte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (1938)). "The
lack of enrollment... is not determinative of status .... [T]he refusal of the Department of
Interior to enroll a certain Indian as a member of a certain tribe is not necessarily an
administrative determination that the person is not an Indian." Id. at 1224 (quoting Ex
parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 31).
231. Id. at 1226-27. Additional facts were that Ms. Bruce "associate[d] with Indian per-
sons," "was married for a time to an Indian," and her mother was an enrolled member of
the Turtle Mountain Tribe of Oklahoma. Id. at 1231, 1235. According to the dissent, there
was no evidence that Ms. Bruce held herself out as an Indian. Id. at 1232 (Rymer, J., dis-
senting).
232. Id. at 1231. The effect of the test proposed by the dissent would render moot the
first prong of the Rogers test. See id. at 1225 (majority opinion).
233. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1232-33 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
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tacts with the tribe were significant.234 Rather, ignoring the spirit
of the Duro-fix entirely, the dissent noted that Bruce's blood was
not the same as the tribe exercising criminal jurisdiction and
found her ties to be typical of many non-Indians. 235
ii) Not Recognized as an Indian
In 1900, a federal circuit court in Washington outlined the
prongs of the Rogers test, and then narrowed the recognition in-
quiry to the circumstances of the individual's birth.23 6 Judge Han-
ford, writing for the majority, declared it was common knowledge
that some "half-breed237 children of unmarried Indian mothers
never do have the recognition, support, or care from their fathers
.... They grow up among Indians, and live as Indians, and are as
much the subject of governmental concern as Indians full
blood."238 However, in this particular case, the defendant was
born off the reservation to a white man and Indian woman mar-
ried in accordance with the laws of the Washington territory.239
Although he had lived on the then Yakima Reservation for almost
twenty years, the court found that his class status was fixed at
birth. Thus, the defendant was distinguished as a non-Indian, "as
any other civilized people are distinct from savages."
240
234. Id. at 1231-32, 1235.
235. Id. at 1235.
236. United States v. Hadley, 99 F. 437, 438 (C.C.N.D. Wash. 1900).
237. A variant of the "half-breed classification" test utilized by the Hadley court was
followed by the Montana district court in evaluating a taxation case where the petitioner
was born in Indian country to a Canadian Frenchman father and a Piegan Indian mother.
United States v. Higgins, 103 F. 348, 349 (C.C.D. Mont. 1900) [hereinafter Higgins I]. His
mother was adopted into the Flathead Indian Tribe with the consent of the head chief and
chiefs of the tribe, and her children were also recognized as members. Id. The petitioner,
Alexander Matt, thereafter lived on the Flathead Indian Reservation for twenty-six years.
Nonetheless, the tax collector of Missoula County claimed that Matt's status must follow
that of his father, a white man, since a white man, even if adopted by a tribe, "cannot
escape his responsibilities as a white man." Id. Judge Knowles, after conducting an exten-
sive review of the recognition of half-breeds by the federal government, held that Matt was
an Indian because he was born in Indian country; neither he nor his parents ever severed
their tribal relations; he was treated by the government as an Indian, and his father was
not shown to be a United States citizen. Id. at 349-52; see also United States v. Higgins, 110
F. 609, 611 (C.C.D. Mont. 1901) [hereinafter Higgins II]. For further discussion of various
mixedblood status tests utilized by courts in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centu-
ries, see generally Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law
to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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Similarly, in United States v. Higgins (Higgins II), Judge
Knowles adopted the citizenship by birthplace test for mixed-
bloods, 241 and was able to distinguish his United States v. Higgins
(Higgins I) holding in what appears to be a rather absurd result
from today's vantage point.242 Oliver Gibeau, the petitioner, was
born in Missoula County to a white father and a Spokane Indian
mother.243 When he was seventeen years old, Gibeau's mother
(and later his father) moved with him to the Flathead Indian Res-
ervation, where his mother applied and was admitted as a mem-
ber of the Nation.244 Gibeau grew up on the reservation and be-
came chief of the Indian police. 245 The court asked, "[d]id the fact
of his going upon the reservation with his mother, and adopting
the habits of the Indians, change his status?"246 The court an-
swered, "By Indian polity he might, by them, be classed as an In-
dian, but not by the constitution and laws of the United States."247
In Vialpando v. State, before the Wyoming Supreme Court in
1982, Dennis Vialpando lived on the Wind River Indian Reserva-
tion of the Shoshone Tribe for many years, and it was stipulated
that he "has been recognized as an Indian by the Shoshone Indian
Tribe and others."248 Vialpando held a non-enrolled Indian fishing
permit for the reservation rather than the permit given to non-
Indians. In the appendix of stipulated facts attached to the court's
opinion and summarized therein, the State conceded: "Dennis Vi-
alpando takes great pride in his Indian ancestry and heritage and
in fact this criminal action arose out of his efforts to enforce tribal
game and fish regulations against three whites who were fishing
on the Wind River Indian Reservation without non-Indian fishing
permits."249 Moreover, his father and paternal grandmother were
enrolled members of the Shoshone Indian Tribe; he frequently vis-
ited his Indian relatives; he had used his free medical benefits at a
BIA health clinic; he attended pow-wows and other Indian cul-
tural events, and brought his children along to help instill an ap-
preciation for Indian heritage.
250
241. See supra note 237.
242. Higgins 11, 110 F. at 611.
243. Id. at 610.
244. Id.
245. Id.; cf. In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (E.D. Wash. 2004).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 611.





Montana Law Review, Vol. 67 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
2006 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION & INDIAN STATUS
After reviewing Ex parte Pero and subsequent cases, the Vial-
pando court decided to adopt the test of "substantial amount of
Indian blood plus a racial status in fact as an Indian;" racial sta-
tus encompassing recognition by the Indian tribe, society in gen-
eral, or the federal government. The court reversed the logic of Ex
parte Pero so as to imply that non-enrollment is evidence of non-
Indian status, yet appeared to agree with other courts that no one
factor is dispositive. 251 The factors considered by the court were
enrollment (and eligibility for enrollment), lifestyle, residence,
and employment. 252 Because Vialpando was not enrolled in any
tribe nor eligible for Shoshone enrollment and was "employed by
drilling companies which 'work all over the eastern and western
United States"' (supposedly indicating a non-Indian lifestyle), the
court found he was not recognized as an Indian.253 The court con-
ceded Vialpando did have an Indian lifestyle with respect to recre-
ation and visitation, but dismissed other cultural affiliations, such
as those provided by pow-wows, for not being restricted to Indi-
ans.25 4 In concurring, Justice Rooney stressed that lack of enroll-
ment here was the proper basis for the finding of non-Indian sta-
tus, and argued that the blood prong should be discarded as ra-
cist.25
5
The Montana Supreme Court was the only court to adopt the
St. Cloud factors prior to the Duro-fix legislation. 256 In LaPier v.
State (LaPier I), the court stated that LaPier was affiliated with
the Little Shell Band of Landless Chippewa Indians of Montana
and the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewas - with a blood quan-
tum combined from those tribes.257 Although the crime occurred
on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, the court did not indicate a
possible affiliation with the Blackfeet Tribe. 258 Justice Weber,
writing for the court, agreed that LaPier's lack of formal enroll-
ment was not dispositive, but also implied it was a significant neg-
ative indicator. 259 Moving on to the second St. Cloud factor, the
251. Id. at 79-80.
252. Id. at 80.
253. Id. The court equates "racial status in fact as an Indian" with the recognition prong
from Rogers.
254. Vialpando, 640 P.2d at 81.
255. Id. at 81-83 (Rooney, J., concurring).
256. LaPier I, 242 Mont. 335, 341, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (1990).
257. Id., 790 P.2d at 986.
258. Cf LaPier II, 986 F.2d 303, 306 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing that LaPier had
'abandoned on appeal any argument that he is affiliated with.., the Blackfeet Tribe of the
Blackfeet Reservation of Montana").
259. LaPier I, 242 Mont. at 342, 790 P.2d at 987.
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court noted that the Indian health service benefits received by La-
Pier "were not reserved solely for Indians."26 0 The court, however,
did give weight to the fact that he received educational assistance
and attended a college sponsored by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA).261 The court did not mention anything under the third St.
Cloud factor ("enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation"), although La-
Pier's multiple prosecutions in tribal court may be a benefit for
those like him who claim Indian status.262 Facts considered by the
court to be relevant to the fourth St. Cloud factor were that LaPier
lived all of his life off the reservation except for a few summers
and one year of high school; he was "employed on an all-Indian
fire fighting crew;" he "occasionally played basketball on all-In-
dian basketball teams;" and he "occasionally attended Browning
Indian Days" and Indian "give aways."263 In conclusion, the court
determined that "the record reveals an integration into non-In-
dian society, and an absence of cultural identity as an Indian."
264
State ex rel. Poll v. Montana Ninth Judicial District Court is
another case arising from the Blackfeet Reservation. 265 The defen-
dant, Don Juneau, had no Indian blood but was adopted by an
Indian and spent his entire life on the reservation.
266
Don Juneau testified that he is not enrolled as a member of any
federally recognized Indian tribe; he does not vote in Indian elec-
tions; he does not receive any per capita federal benefits as an In-
dian; and, he has never held a Tribal office. * * *
Defendants contend that although Don Juneau is not a tribal mem-
ber and he has no Indian blood, everything else about his life is In-
dian; he was adopted by an Indian; attended Indian schools; prac-
ticed the Indian religion; participated in tribal customs; married an
Indian; has Indian friends; and, has Indian children.
2 6 7
The court nevertheless concluded that the recognition prong was
not satisfied due to non-enrollment and ineligibility for federal
benefits.26
8
In 1995, a divided Eighth Circuit panel decided United States
v. Lawrence.269 The question was whether the alleged victim of
260. Id. at 343, 790 P.2d at 988.
261. Id., 790 P.2d at 987-88.
262. Id. at 342, 790 P.2d at 987; see United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1226-27
(2005) ("arrested Indian").
263. Lapier 1, 242 Mont. at 342, 790 P.2d at 987.
264. Id. at 343, 790 P.2d at 988.
265. 257 Mont. 512, 513, 851 P.2d 405, 405 (1993).
266. Id. at 515, 851 P.2d at 406.
267. Id., 851 P.2d at 407.
268. Id.
269. 51 F.3d 150 (8th Cir. 1995).
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sexual child abuse was an Indian.270 The critical facts were that
seven months prior to the alleged incident,
the Oglala Sioux, acting through the tribal court, affirmatively in-
tervened to assume responsibility for the care and protection of this
girl. The child had been abandoned in Las Vegas and had subse-
quently been relegated to a shelter there. Acting at the request of
the child's grandmother, who was unable to act herself on behalf of
the child, the tribe asserted its right of intervention under 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911 and acquired jurisdiction over the custody proceedings. The
Oglala Sioux tribal court exercised its authority to make the girl a
ward of the court and she was moved from Nevada to the Oglala
Sioux reservation. The tribal court then placed her in the care of her
grandmother.
2 7 1
The majority categorized the tribal court's involvement under
the third St. Cloud factor: "enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affil-
iation."272 In this situation, however, the court did not think the
tribe's actions rose to the level of recognition. 273 The dissenting
opinion chastised the lower court for "trivializ[ing]" the tribal
court's choice "to cloak this girl in the security of a wardship."274
The dissent also took issue with the St. Cloud factors' narrow des-
ignation of tribal enrollment as the sole means of official tribal
recognition. 275 Judge McKay opined: "The majority, although at-
tributing some importance to the actions of the tribal court, mini-
mizes their significance by relegating its consideration of those ac-
tions to the third (and third least important) prong of the frame-
work suggested in St. Cloud v. United States."276
In the In re Garvais case, mentioned at the beginning of this
Article, Senior United States District Judge Quackenbush con-
cluded that Duane Garvais was not subject to the criminal juris-
diction of the Spokane Tribal Court;277 finding that:
Garvais' connections to Indian life were for a limited duration. He
was never regarded by members of either the Spokane or Colville
Tribes as being an enrolled member of any Tribe. He was only re-
garded as one who had Indian blood by reason of being a descendant
of an Indian.
2 78
270. Id. at 152.
271. Id. at 154-55 (McKay, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 153 (majority opinion).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 155 n.2 (McKay, J., dissenting).
275. Lawrence, 51 F.3d at 155 n.1.
276. Id. at 155; cf. United States v. Drewry, 365 F.3d 957 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding tribal
recognition of children under lesser St. Cloud factors).
277. In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (E.D. Wash. 2004).
278. Id.
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In re Garvais illustrates the ambiguities of the Rogers test,
and it illuminates the clash between narrow notions of political
consent and cultural forms of group identity. As a non-enrolled
individual, Garvais was not eligible to vote in Spokane tribal elec-
tions or receive tribal per capita payments.279 He did not have
Spokane tribal rights to hunt or fish, but, as a descendant of an
enrolled Colville member, he occasionally received medical care at
the Colville Tribal Health Service. 280 Garvais' ex-wife testified
that he had participated in Indian activities such as Indian bas-
ketball games and pow-wows. 28 1 His connections to Indian spiritu-
ality included sweathouse use and "possession of a sacred Indian
feather in his truck."2 2 Garvais lived on the Spokane Indian Res-
ervation for nineteen months while employed as a BIA police of-
ficer.28 3 And, on his BIA employment application, Garvais stated:
"I am pending enrollment with the Assiniboine tribe in the near
future with a documented blood degree of 5/8."284 Importantly, al-
though the Spokane Tribe knew that Garvais was not an enrolled
or recognized member of any other tribe, it allegedly recognized
him to be an informal member Indian within the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the Spokane Tribe.2 5 Nonetheless, according to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington,
Garvais was not an Indian.
28 6
b) Nonmembership in Tribe Asserting Jurisdiction
In State v. Hagen, Robert P. Hagen was convicted of selling
marijuana within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and
Ouray Indian Reservation. 28 7 Hagen was not an enrolled member
of any tribe, but he testified to being "a member of the Little Shell
Tribe of Chippewa Indians."2 8 Hagen further testified "that he
has lived on Indian reservations all his life, that he has attended
reservation school and been treated at reservation hospitals, ...
[and] that he had received proceeds from a judgment entered in
favor of various bands of the Chippewas pursuant to a distribution
279. Id. at 1222.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1223.
282. Id.
283. In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1222, 1226.
286. Id. at 1226.
287. 802 P.2d 745, 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (reversed on other grounds).
288. Id. at 747 (emphasis added).
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made by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.. .. 289 Judge Orme, writing
for a unanimous court, concluded there was "simply no way" that
Hagen was recognized as a non-Indian.
290
3. Informal Recognition in Absence of Significant Contacts
a) Recognized as an Indian
In United States v. Dodge, the Eighth Circuit employed the
Rogers test in determining both appellants to be Indian under the
Major Crimes Act with respect to crimes committed on the Pine
Ridge Indian Reservation during the occupation of Wounded
Knee. 29 1 One appellant, Manuel M. Alvarado, applied three-and-
a-half years earlier to be entered on the judgment rolls of Califor-
nia as a member of the Yurok Tribe, and claimed to know the
number of his previous entry on a judgment roll in 1950.292 The
court implied that recognition by the federal government was pos-
sible because Alvarado had held himself out as an Indian eligible
for enrollment. (Another appellant, Terry Gene Williams, was an
enrolled member of the Pawnee Tribe.)293 The Dodge court was
the first court after the passage of the 1924 Citizenship Act 294 to
expressly include federal government recognition in the second
prong of the Rogers test, in addition to tribal recognition. 295 For
support, Judge Heaney cited the now controversial 1958 version of
Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law which had been
revised to present a viewpoint more favorable to the federal gov-
ernment. 296 The 1982 and 2005 editions agree, in line with Ex
parte Pero and modern opinions, that the Rogers test recognition
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 538 F.2d 770, 785-87 (8th Cir. 1976).
292. Id.
293. Id.; cf State v. Allan, 607 P.2d 426 (Idaho 1980) (similarly involving formally recog-
nized nonmember Indian); supra notes 166-71.
294. Dodge, 538 F.2d at 785-87; United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th
Cir. 1979) (citing Dodge, 538 F.2d at 786) was the first Ninth Circuit opinion to add govern-
mental recognition to the Rogers test.
295. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000).
296. See Joseph F. Rarick, Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 Edi-
tion, 11 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 85, 85 (1986) (book review) ("The 1958 book is a self-confessed
product of the switch of congressional policy from tolerance to termination. . ."). The so-
called "Bennett Handbook" of 1958, named after another Solicitor for the Department of
Interior, was meant to "foreclos[e], if possible, further uncritical use of the earlier edition
by judges, lawyers, and laymen." BENNETT", supra note 54, at 1. See also STRICKLAND, supra
note 17, at ix ("The 1958 edition did not reflect Felix Cohen's work. Many of Cohen's care-
fully considered conclusions were discarded.").
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prong does not require federal recognition. The original Hand-
book published in 1942, however, does cite a pre-1924 Act case for
the proposition that "[w]ithin the meaning of those various stat-
utes which though applicable to Indians do not define them ...
courts have heeded both recognition by the tribe or society of Indi-
ans and recognition by the Federal Government as expressed in
treaty and statute."
297
The locus of the crime in United States v. Pemberton was the
Red Lake Indian Reservation, where Arnold Pemberton was born,
attended primary and secondary school, and continued to live.298
Although Pemberton "was not an enrolled member of any tribe,"
he testified to being an Indian. 299 Judge Bye's unanimous opinion
found sufficient evidence of Indian status because Pemberton held
himself out to be Indian (and was of Indian blood).
300
b) Not Recognized as an Indian
In 1887, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Ketchum,
adjudged that Ketchum, a full blooded Indian, was not legally an
Indian.30 ' There the defendant did not appear to be recognized as
a member of any Indian tribe, and the tribe of his ancestors was
not recognized by the government. 30 2 Moreover, "it appeared that
he had lived among the whites for several years. Ketchum had his
own cabin, and about three acres of land around it, which he culti-
vated, and on which he raised vegetables."30 3
In 1901, the Washington Supreme Court considered the case
of State v. Howard, involving a conviction for manslaughter occur-
ring on the Puyallup Indian Reservation. 30 4 The evidence did not
show that Howard had ever lived on the reservation, but he did
appear to have attended the Puyallup Indian school. 30 5 There was
also no evidence that Howard had ties to his parents' tribes. 30 6 For
297. COHEN, supra note 54, at 3.
298. 405 F.3d 656, 658-59 (8th Cir. 2005).
299. Id. at 658.
300. Id. at 660. The rendition of the Rogers rule in Pemberton is problematic because the
Court, perhaps unintentionally, implies that enrollment equals recognition and that the
Court must go beyond the recognition prong for other indicia of recognition and self-identi-
fication.
301. 15 P. 353 (Cal. 1887).
302. Id.
303. Id.
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several years prior to the criminal act, Howard lived with his fam-
ily apart from any tribe, and worked for the Gentry Bros.' show.
30 7
The court held that the defendant had not demonstrated sus-
tained tribal relations and thus the state court had jurisdiction
over him as a non-Indian. 30 8 Judge Hadley, writing for the major-
ity, further analyzed whether the Major Crimes Act applied to all
Indians by ancestry or only to tribal Indians. 30 9 First, it was noted
that the language from United States v. Kagama inferred "that
the offending Indian shall belong to that or some other tribe."
310
Next, the court acknowledged it had not found any cases wherein
an Indian by blood with no tribal relations had been tried under
the Act. 311 The court concluded that "an Indian who is not allied
with any tribe" is no longer a subject of federal guardianship.
3 12
In People ex rel. Schuyler v. Livingstone, in which an Oneida
descendant committed a crime on the Onondaga Reservation, a
lower court of New York cited a rule that "the status of an Indian
may be proved by general reputation or his residence upon a res-
ervation."313 The court then proceeded to find the defendant, who
had lived on and off the Onondaga Reservation for thirty-three
years, to be treated as a non-Indian for the purpose of state juris-
diction.314 Judge Cheney labeled Rosanna Schuyler a "sojourning
Indian" who was not a member of the Onondaga tribe. 31 5
In State v. Attebery, the defendant was a Cherokee Indian by
ancestry but his only association with an Indian tribe was when,
many years earlier, he lived for three months on the Apache Res-
ervation. 31 6 The Arizona Supreme Court noted that the defen-
dant's father resided on a Cherokee reservation; however, this was
weighed against the fact that the father had never lived on the
Gila River Indian Reservation where the crime occurred. 31 7 The
307. Id. at 383-84.
308. Id. at 384.
309. Id. at 384-85.
310. Howard, 74 P. at 384 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886)).
311. Id. at 385.
312. Id.
313. 205 N.Y.S. 888, 889-90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1924) (citing Charbonneau v. DeLorimier, 8
Que. Pr. 115).
314. Id. The Onondagas are one of the Six Nations in New York State. Id. at 891.
315. Id. at 894. But cf State v. Allan, 607 P.2d 426, 433 (Idaho 1980) (McFadden, J.,
concurring) (distinguishing Schulyer on basis of the "Very unusual relationship between
the state of New York and the Odondagas and Oneidas").
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court held that the defendant was a non-Indian under the second
prong of the Rogers test.3 18
In State v. Bonaparte, the Idaho Court of Appeals focused on
recognition of Indian status by the federal government because
there was no evidence supporting tribal recognition.31 9 Inciden-
tally, the court noted that under the Idaho Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Allan, "Bonaparte would have been entitled to recognition
as an Indian had he been a member of any tribe, regardless of the
reservation on which he resided."320 As to the claim of federal gov-
ernment recognition, the court evaluated eligibility for social pro-
grams and the treatment of descendants of enrolled tribal mem-
bers under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934.321 Judge
Burnett opined:
[Tihe criteria governing social program eligibility do not embody the
objectives of criminal jurisdiction. Neither do we construe the IRA
to place the imprimatur of Indian status, for criminal jurisdiction
purposes, upon all present-day "descendants" residing on reserva-
tions, irrespective of their degree of Indian blood or their lack of
tribal recognition.
32 2
Since Douglas Bonaparte was not an enrolled member of any
tribe, was not eligible for enrollment in the Nez Perce Tribe with
which he alleged an affiliation, and there was no "substantial indi-
cia of federal recognition," the court determined he was non-In-
dian. 323 Judge Burnett, in dicta, concluded that the frequent fed-
eral court refrain - that non-enrollment is not a factor dispositive
of Indian status for criminal jurisdiction - suggests "a mistaken
enrollment does not confer federal jurisdiction."324 Moreover, he
posited that an unreasonable denial of recognition by a tribe, as
opposed to the simple lack of recognition in the instant case,
would not bar federal jurisdiction. 325
In United States v. Driver, Judge Porter had another opportu-
nity to employ his St. Cloud factors. 326 As to the first factor, the
court stated that the defendant's eligibility for enrollment was not
a consideration.327 The only corroborated evidence of government
318. Id.
319. 759 P.2d 83, 85 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
320. Id. at 85 n.1 (citing Allan, 607 P.2d at 426).
321. Id. at 85.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 85-86.
324. Id. at 86.
325. Bonaparte, 759 P.2d at 86.
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assistance was that Driver once received medical treatment avail-
able to enrolled members, such as his father, and Driver's chil-
dren.3 28 Finally, in regard to the third and fourth factors, the
court decided that Driver's "sporadic visits" to the reservation "did
not rise to the level of enjoying 'the benefits of tribal affiliation' or
'living on the reservation and participating in Indian social
life."' 329
In Lewis, the Idaho Court of Appeals alluded to the St. Cloud
factors as requiring "significant affiliation" rather than "minor
contacts with the reservation and tribes."330 Lewis was not en-
rolled in any tribe. 331 His contacts with the Fort Hall Indian Res-
ervation (where the crime occurred) entailed living on the reserva-
tion when he was a young child; having a brother and sister who
were enrolled members; co-owning some property on the reserva-
tion; and once attending the Shoshone-Bannock Indian festival as
a child.3 32 Judge Lansing determined that the defendant was a
non-Indian on account of the absence of any significant contacts:
Lewis did not apply for tribal enrollment nor express an interest
in doing so prior to his criminal conviction; he maintained no tri-
bal relations nor significant contact with his relatives; he did not
participate in tribal activities other than the one-time festival
visit; he had no record of reservation employment; he did not seek
any federal benefits available for Indians; and he had no personal
contact with Indian religions.333
C. Various Interpretations of the Rogers Test
It is evident from a chronological view of twentieth century
cases exhibited above that the pendulum has swung from an em-
phasis on social recognition to political recognition 334 of Indian
328. Id. at 888-89, 889 n.9.
329. Id. at 889.
330. 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002). The Idaho Court of Appeals applied a clear-
error standard of review. Id. But see United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir.
2005) (applying de novo standard of review).
331. Lewis, 55 P.3d at 878.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See Means's characterization of Indian status as requiring political recognition:
"Taken together, the 1990 Amendments, the Major Crimes Act, and Antelope mean that the
criminal jurisdiction of tribes over 'all Indians' recognized by the 1990 Amendments means
all of Indian ancestry who are also Indians by political affiliation, not all who are racially
Indians." Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (referring to United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977)).
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status.335 This shift in common law stems from congressional poli-
cies of assimilation and termination, the notion of dual allegiances
resulting from United States v. Nice336 and the Citizenship Act of
1924, and courts' growing sensitivity to perceived racism 337 and
equal protection concerns.338 Although there has always been a
quasi-political element to the Rogers test, status prior to 1916 was
generally made plain by the rigid constraints of single citizen-
ship.339 The path for an Indian to become a citizen of the United
States involved the severing of tribal relations, and the steps
taken were not to be lightly inferred. Thus, until the Citizenship
Act, Indian status often precluded the possibility of United States
citizenship.
Felix Cohen described the courts' pre-1924 analysis of the In-
dian status recognition prong as "heed [ing] both recognition by the
tribe or society of Indians and recognition by the Federal Govern-
ment as expressed in treaty and statute."340 The treaties and stat-
utes referred to were those recognizing mixed-blood individuals as
Indians, since courts were reluctant to hold that a person was de-
prived by birth of the privileges and benefits of United States citi-
zenship. 3
41
The role of the federal courts in the aftermath of the Dawes
Act can be characterized as protecting Indian status from states
eager to assert state sovereignty over patent-in-fee Indians.
Hence, recognition by the federal government was construed by
federal courts to affirm Indian status. All inferences were to be
drawn to the benefit of finding continued federal guardianship
over the individual. 3
42
With the Congressional policy change toward fostering tribal
government, signaled by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,3 4
3
and the concept of tribal rolls carried over from the Dawes Act,
344
the stage was set for using formal enrollment as the courts' pri-
335. See supra Part III.B.
336. 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
337. See, e.g., Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 81 (Wyo. 1982) (Rooney, J., concurring).
338. See, e.g., United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1234 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rymer, J.,
dissenting).
339. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 3, at 26-27, 30-31.
340. COHEN, supra note 54, at 3.
341. Id. at 3 n.14.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
343. DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 187-88 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter GETCHES ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS].
344. Id. at 141.
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mary tool under the Rogers recognition prong. In his 1976 article
on criminal jurisdiction, Professor Clinton may have been reacting
to the "enrollment as recognition" trend345 by restating the Rogers
test with an emphasis on social recognition.346 The Dodge Court,
two years later, dropped the reference to recognition by treaty and
statute,347 and simply phrased the recognition prong as "recogni-
tion by a tribe or society of Indians or by the federal govern-
ment."348 With courts favoring brevity, Dodge became an oft-cited
rule. Both the Strickland version of Cohen's Indian Law Hand-
book and the Canby Nutshell sought to restore the Rogers second
prong to "an Indian must be regarded as an Indian by his or her
community,"349 but those efforts do not appear to have corrected
the not-so-innocent detour from the well-established path of the
Rogers test. The unintended consequence of Dodge is a judicial fo-
cus on tribal rolls, which embody the politics of conquest, not nec-
essarily the politics of Indian tribes.
The Supreme Court catalyzed an even greater emphasis on
the political aspects of recognition with its Mancari and Antelope
opinions. As Professor Clinton's Jurisdictional Maze article went
to press, the editors noted:
Part 3 of the Court's opinion [in Antelope], in suggesting that the
jurisdictional term "Indian" is not a racial classification, seems to
approve in dicta a definition which is not solely based on racial an-
cestry and social recognition, as suggested herein, but which also
requires some political and legal recognition of the tribe of the de-
fendant by the federal government.
3 50
Responding to footnote seven of Antelope,351 the Eighth and Ninth
circuits in St. Cloud352 and LaPier H,35 3 respectively, incorporated
federal recognition of the tribe as an addition to the Rogers test.
Counsel for Duane Garvais sought to further embellish the
Rogers test by inserting the federally-recognized tribe require-
345. Enrollment or eligibility for enrollment is advocated by Judge Rymer as the bright
line test for avoiding equal protection concerns arising from the blood prong. United States
v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rymer, J., dissenting).
346. Professor Clinton further wrote: "Recognition might be by society as a whole." But
there is little support for that proposition. See Clinton, supra note 91, at 516 (citing People
ex rel. Schuyler v. Livingstone, 205 N.Y.S. 888 (Sup. Ct. 1924)).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 340-42.
348. United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (1976) (citing BENNETr, supra note 54, at
8); see supra note 296 for discussion of this edition, the "Bennett Handbook."
349. CANBY, supra note 33, at 7; STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 20.
350. Clinton, supra note 91, at 576 (editors' note).
351. 430 U.S. 641, 646 n.7 (1977).
352. 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (D.S.D. 1988).
353. 986 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1993).
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ment into each of the Rogers prongs. 354 In other words, to achieve
Indian status, an individual must have blood from a federally rec-
ognized tribe and be recognized as a member of a federally recog-
nized tribe. 355 The Spokane Tribe argued in reply that no case has
mandated full incorporation for equal protection purposes. 356 "A
full incorporation would have the effect of diluting the ability of
tribal courts to establish jurisdiction over persons who have
clearly consented to tribal laws, simply because the tribe has not
endeavored to classify the person as a member of a particular
tribe."35 7 The Spokane Tribe offered that federal recognition of the
tribe should be incorporated either as a threshold question rela-
tive to the individual's claimed affiliation or by partially incorpo-
rating it into the blood prong of the Rogers test.358
A universe of eight possible combinations may exist within
the Rogers framework, assuming that the tribe asserting jurisdic-
tion is federally recognized:
Blood Prong + Recognition Prong
1) Indian Blood in + Recognized as an Indian in
General (IBG) General (RIG);
2) IBG + Member of Tribe Asserting
Jurisdiction (MTAJ);
3) IBG + Member of Specific Other
Federally Recognized Tribe
(MSOFRT);359
4) IBG + Member of Specific Other Tribe
Not Federally Recognized
(MSOTNFR)
5) Federally Recognized + RIG;
Indian Blood (FRIB)
6) FRIB + MTAJ;
354. Petitioner's Response to Spokane Tribe's Position Paper Pursuant to Court Order of
September 8, 2004 at 9-10, In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (E.D. Wash. 2004) (No. CS-
03-0291-JLQ).
355. A list of tribes that are not federally recognized is available at http://www.kstrom.
net'isk/maps/tribesnonrec.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). For federally recognized tribes,
see Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,193 (Nov. 25, 2005), available at http://fact
finder.census.gov/home/aian/indian--entities-l1-25.pdf.
356. Spokane Tribe's Reply Pursuant to Court Order of September 8, 2004 at 12, In re
Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (E.D. Wash. 2004) (No. CS-03-0291-JLQ).
357. Id.
358. Id. at 11-12.
359. Note that this interpretation has the same effect as the Lapier H threshold inquiry
of federal recognition of the tribe of claimed affiliation.
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7) FRIB + MSOFRT;
8) FRIB + MSOTNFR.
Combinations 1 and 5 were espoused by the Spokane Tribe. Only
combinations 5, 6 and 7 would be acceptable according to attor-
neys for Garvais. The Washington Court of Appeals has expressly
endorsed adding the federally recognized tribe requirement to the
second prong - encompassing combinations 2 and 3.360 Judge
Rymer's dissent in Bruce argued that only combinations 6 and 7
are satisfactory, and would further require that the blood quan-
tum be at the level necessary for enrollment in a federally recog-
nized tribe.361 Means v. Navajo Nation suggests disapproval of
combinations 1, 4, and 8.362
To further complicate matters, it is not clear whether the
blood and recognition prongs are dependent or independent vari-
ables. Some courts have implied that the less Indian blood in an
individual, the greater the presumption he or she is not recog-
nized as an Indian.363 Finally, in State v. Daniels, where the state
conceded defendant's Canadian Indian status, Judge Brown held
that defendant's "Canadian nationality does not divest him of his
racial identity." 64 Does this suggest that ancestry may be traced
to any tribe existing in the Americas prior to the period of discov-
ery by Europeans? 365 What if the non-Indian Peruvian in Lewis
366
had had South American Indian blood?
IV. CONGRESSIONAL CALIBRATION OF THE ROGERS TEST
The Rehnquist Court has been described by one scholar as at-
tempting to harmonize federal Indian law and the general law via
a "dormant plenary power impulse."367 The most recent legislative
response to counter and restrain the Court's impulse was the
360. State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
361. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1234-36 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rymer, J., dissent-
ing).
362. 432 F.3d 924, 934 (9th Cir. 2005).
363. See supra text accompanying note 110.
364. Daniels, 16 P.3d at 654. Mr. Daniels claimed that his "father's people followed Sit-
ting Bull into Canada." Id. at 651.
365. Compare COHEN, supra note 54, at 2 ("[t]hat some of his ancestors lived in America
before its discovery by the white race") with NEWTON, supra note 45, at 171-72 ("that some
of the individual's ancestors lived in what is now the United States before its discovery by
Europeans").
366. Lewis v. State, 55 P.3d 875, 877 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).
367. Frickey, supra note 19, at 79; see generally Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note
18.
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Duro-fix.368 The conference committee report reads, in pertinent
part:
Throughout the history of this country, the Congress has never
questioned the power of tribal courts to exercise misdemeanor juris-
diction over non-tribal member Indians in the same manner that
such courts exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction over tribal members.
Instead, the Congress has recognized that tribal governments afford
a broad array of rights and privileges to non-tribal members. Non-
tribal member Indians own property on Indian reservations, their
children attend tribal schools, their families receive health care
from tribal hospitals and clinics. Federally-administered programs
and services are provided to Indian people because of their status as
Indians without regard to whether their tribal membership is the
same as their reservation residence. The issue of Who is an Indian
for purposes of Federal law is well-settled as a function of two hun-
dred years of Constitutional and case law and Federal statutes.369
Yet no court, in deciding who is Indian for purposes of criminal
jurisdiction, has considered the effect of the Duro-fix.370 Instead,
the judiciary has moved far afield from the general principles es-
tablished over the last two hundred years. Some courts have read-
ily accepted St. Cloud's narrowing of the Indian status inquiry,
even though St. Cloud compromises the Rogers test by emphasiz-
ing enrollment 371 and introducing a hierarchy that was not well-
settled when Congress used its plenary powers to rewrite the
Court's narrow view of Indian history and government in Duro
1.372
368. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
369. H.R. REP. No. 102-61, at 5 (1991) (Conf. Rep.) (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-938, at 132
(Conf. Rep)) (emphasis added).
370. The only observation by the Bruce Court was that the definition of "Indian" in the
ICRA seems to beg the question. 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005). The court failed to
consider the legislative context of the Duro-fix and its objectives. Judge Rymer, dissenting,
relied on the Supreme Court's dismissal of the contacts test without examining the implica-
tions of the Duro-fix. Id. at 1234-35 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
371. If federal definitions referencing tribal membership are interpreted to require
formal enrollment, they may exclude some non-enrolled individuals who are ac-
knowledged participants in their tribal communities. For example, an individual
may speak the language, participate in religious ceremonies, and be the child of an
enrolled member. But if that particular tribe reckons membership through a per-
son's mother, and the parent who is an enrolled member is the person's father, that
individual may not be eligible for formal enrollment. In fact, the concept of formal
enrollment has no counterpart in traditional tribal views of membership.
NEWTON, supra note 45, at 179.
372. The field of Indian law has an historical, as well as a contemporary, dimension.
In the two centuries of our national existence, Indians and Indian tribes have under-
gone profound changes in living habits, institutions, needs, and aspirations. Those
changes are perhaps more pronounced than the differences that separate Anglo-
American society from the ages for which Hammurabi, Moses, Lycurgus, or Justin-
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Now that the Lara Court has validated the inherent tribal
sovereignty over all Indians as expressed in the Duro-fix,373 lower
courts should be mindful of Congressional intent and wary of pre-
cedent that does not consider Congress' restoration of significant
contacts within the second prong of the Rogers test. In particular,
when addressing the Rogers prongs in light of the Duro-fix, courts
should not deviate from the canon of statutory construction that
resolves all ambiguities in favor of Indian sovereignty.37 4 In doing
so, courts will be better equipped to avoid repeating past misinter-
pretations of the federal-tribal relationship. 375 Furthermore,
courts should apply the Duro-fix policy in the form of significant
contacts376 so as to broaden the conception of membership to in-
clude de facto membership and thus help avoid unconstitutional
applications of the ICRA amendment.377 Finally, state and federal
courts should be aware of tribal court interpretations of Indian
status and consider the doctrine of comity now that the Duro-fix
has imposed the Rogers framework on both tribal and non-tribal
courts.
A. The Prongs
It is well-settled that the Rogers test contains an ancestry or
blood prong.378 One scholar cites Nofire379 for the proposition that
blood need not be a consideration, 380 but the Rogers line of cases
does not support that interpretation, and the legislative history of
the Duro-fix clearly contemplates that the blood prong would be
the primary "racial" separator of Indians and non-Indians. Self-
described Indian-fighter Senator Slade Gorton's 38 1 main concern
ian legislated. Telescoped into a century and a half, therefore, one may find changes
in Indian social, political, and property relations that are at least as great as the
evolution of thirty centuries of European civilization.
STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 2.
373. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
374. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abro-
gation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is
That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 608-19 (1975), reprinted in GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERI-
ALs, supra note 343, at 127-29.
375. See, e.g., Duro H, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
376. The Supreme Court dismissed the Ninth Circuit's contacts analysis; Congress, by
implication, rehabilitated it in the Duro-fix, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000). See infra Part IV.B.
377. See, e.g., United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996).
378. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005).
379. Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897).
380. See Clinton, supra note 91, at 516 n.60.
381. Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L.
REV. 5, 17 (2004) (citing Lewis Kamb, Tribes Flex Growing Muscle at Ballot Box: 'Great
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was to prevent the Duro-fix from subjecting no-bloods to tribal
courts by blurring the legal boundary between Indians and non-
Indians.38 2 While the Duro-fix may be racist - its constitutional
Achilles' heel - there is no doubt that the ancestry element
presents a bright-line way to exempt from tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion all but those who have Indian ancestors.
The majority rule from the case law discussed in Part III
shows that the prongs are not intended to be weighted. And the
blood prong is either satisfied or not. Given the high rate of inter-
marriage in Indian culture, 38 3 blood quanta of less than one-
eighth should not be viewed as unusual by the courts. Moreover,
an individual's blood need not share the "blood-type" of the recog-
nizing tribe.38 4 Rogers expressly referred to the "family of Indians"
and "the race generally."38 5 By intending to affirm Indian tribal
power over all Indians, the Duro-fix is in accord. After Mancari,
however, it is unclear whether blood must be from a federally rec-
ognized tribe;38 6 arguably, given the absence of such judicial law-
making prior to the Duro-fix, the intent of Congress was that it
does not.
Next, the recognition prong is not the proper place for the fed-
eral recognition threshold question establishing the special rela-
tionship and responsibility of the federal government to the
tribe.38 7 The recognition is of the Indian, not the Indian tribe. The
tribe exercising jurisdiction, however, must be federally recog-
nized. Thus, if an individual is not affiliated with another feder-
ally recognized tribe, the tribe exercising criminal jurisdiction
may prove that it recognizes the individual as an informal mem-
ber.388 Otherwise, the inherent sovereignty to prosecute a non-
member Indian might violate equal protection in the absence of
substantial indicia of federal recognition.
Victory' over Gorton in 2000 Points the Way, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 9, 2004, at
Al).
382. Id.
383. See Gould, Mixing Bodies, supra note 30, at 757-59.
384. STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 23 n.27.
385. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846).
386. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1234 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rymer, J., dissent-
ing).
387. Id. at 1224-25 (majority opinion) ("Nor have we required evidence of federal recog-
nition. Rather, we have emphasized that there must be some evidence of government or
tribal recognition.").
388. "Informal member" may also be referred to as a "de facto member." United States v.
Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1996).
Vol. 67224
48
Montana Law Review, Vol. 67 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
2006 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION & INDIAN STATUS
The term "member" itself does not mean that the individual is
enrolled or eligible for enrollment. 38 9 As the Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledges, "Enrollment is not the only means to establish mem-
bership in a tribal political entity."390 Thus, in theory, an Indian
could be a member of several tribes just as Indians possess multi-
ple citizenships as federal, state, and tribal citizens today. For ex-
ample, an Indian could be an enrolled member of one tribe, and
enjoy per capita payments and other privileges of that tribe, while
residing as a non-dividend member on another tribe's reservation.
The term "member" should be viewed merely as identifying which
tribe has recognized the individual as an Indian. In other words,
primary legal significance follows the "Indian" status determina-
tion; the secondary member/nonmember label with respect to In-
dian status is simply descriptive.
B. The Recognition Factors
The Supreme Court in Duro II dismissed the Ninth Circuit's
"significant contacts" test 391 because "the rationale of the test
would apply to non-Indians on the reservation as readily as to In-
dian nonmembers."392 The Court, however, failed to consider that
the second Rogers prong is fundamentally based on socio-political
contacts. As demonstrated by the cases in Part III.B., the recogni-
tion prong can apply just as readily to individuals with no Indian
ancestry.393 Only the blood prong prevents someone like Rogers
from having Indian status. All in all, the objective of the Rogers
test is to enable a more culturally sensitive means of political clas-
sification than the enrollment-driven one used in Mancari to cir-
cumvent the equal protection guarantee. Thus, if the Court cannot
accept this rationale for some form of a contacts test, then it must
389. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224.
390. Keys, 103 F.3d at 761.
391. Duro 1, 851 F.2d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 1988).
392. Duro 11, 495 U.S. 676, 695 (1990).
393. This Article uses the phrase "Indian by ancestry" as a broad category to include
some who may not have the legal status of an Indian. Other commentators have used the
descriptors "ethnologically Indian," "biologically Indian," or "racially Indian." COHEN, supra
note 54, at 2 (biological and ethnological); BENNETT, supra note 54, at 5 (biological and
ethnological); STRICKLAND, supra note 17, at 19 (ethnological); Clinton, supra note 91, at
514, 520 (biological and ethnological); Dussias, supra note 25, at 80 (ethnological). How-
ever, the word ethnological requires an analysis of culture, thus creating a confusing over-
lap with the second prong of the Rogers test. Scientists have yet to find biologic or genetic
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discard two hundred years of "well-settled"394 law embodied in the
Rogers test.
Fortunately, it appears that the Court might approve a con-
tacts test for a tribe's descendants. 395 Justice Kennedy for the
Duro II majority wrote:
The contacts approach is little more than a variation of the argu-
ment that any person who enters an Indian community should be
deemed to have given implied consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction
over him. We have rejected this approach for non-Indians [in Oli-
phant]. It is a logical consequence of that decision that nonmembers,
who share relevant jurisdictional characteristics of non-Indians,
should share the same jurisdictional status.
3 96
While that characterization of the contacts approach may seem
logical as applied to the high degree of assimilation in Oliphant, it
is less relevant in the majority of Indian status cases, nor does it
do justice to the Duro facts. As evidenced by Duro I, there is an
order of magnitude difference between implied consent and signif-
icant contacts. And, after the Duro-fix, the Court must apply that
contacts approach to descendants of all tribes.
Although significant contacts do not go as far as the expressed
consent paradigm preferred by the Court,397 they are a well-set-
tled basis of the Rogers test. The Duro-fix thus overrides the
Court's aversion to contacts by restoring inherent sovereignty cir-
cumscribed by significant contacts. By endorsing the Rogers case
law, which rejects enrollment as the standard for political consent,
the Duro-fix does more than affirm the inherent sovereignty of In-
dian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians - it
resuscitates the meaning of Indian membership-based sovereignty
to include non-enrolled members. Accordingly, it matters little
whether such de facto or informal members share relevant juris-
dictional characteristics of non-Indians. What counts now is that
Congress' Rogers-based view of membership finds special rele-
vance in ancestry as part of a unique legal status.
Significant contacts in a criminal context, as suggested by
this Article, are those socio-political contacts that rise above the
394. See supra text accompanying note 369.
395. In essence, the Duro II Court suggests that the relevant jurisdictional characteris-
tics of member Indians are driven by what nonmember and non-Indians do not possess:
namely, descent from the federally recognized tribe exercising jurisdiction.
396. Duro H, 495 U.S. at 695-96.
397. Id. at 694 ("Retained criminal jurisdiction over members is accepted by our prece-
dents and justified by the voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant
right of participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on consent.").
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minimum contacts approach of the International Shoe398 line of
civil cases. Courts should view significant contacts as an approach
that restores the Indian status test and thereby helps non-Indian
judges avoid quick conclusions stemming from perceived differ-
ences between culture and politics. Moreover, the significant con-
tacts approach helps to ensure a broad definition of member In-
dian under the Rogers test, thus minimizing potential for uncon-
stitutional applications of the Duro-fix.
In the recognition prong approach used by courts today, no
one factor is dispositive, yet courts are lulled into mainly relying
on the questionable objectivity of BIA rolls. Modern enrollment
policy aims to protect scarce resources and create behavioral type
incentives necessary for the internal strength and cohesion of a
tribe. Enrollment is strong evidence of Indianness, but the nega-
tive is not necessarily true.399 That is, a lack of enrollment or eli-
gibility for enrollment should not weigh in the balance.400 Fur-
thermore, nineteenth century views of civilized versus non-civi-
lized, Anglo-American culture versus Indian culture, or integrated
versus separated should not be allowed to function as relevant di-
chotomies. The recognition factors, to be fair and to avoid cultural
misconceptions, must be viewed as additive, just like contacts. In
short, the absence of any one factor should not offset the presence
of another.
398. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). The original holding in In-
ternational Shoe used the term "sufficient contacts or ties" - not "significant" - to describe a
"quality and nature" of activities that "were neither irregular nor casual" but were "system-
atic and continuous."
399. Charles Park, Enrollment: Procedures and Consequences, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109,
110 (1975):
Although enrollment is the most obvious evidence of tribal membership, care must
be used in ascertaining the specific purpose for which a roll is made. Payment of
money to tribal members under statutes and treaties depends upon enrollment, as
do voting rights in tribal elections and the capacity to be an elected official of the
tribe. Probably most important, however, is the connection between tribal prop-
erty and enrollment, because allotments of land can be made only to enrolled
members.
See also Deloria & Newton, supra note 19, at text accompanying n.29:
In some cases, not enrolling may be a protest against Indian Reorganization Act
governments seen as federally imposed or may be an expression of religious or
cultural conviction. In other cases, the tribe itself may be lax about keeping its
rolls up to date, allowing benefits and political participation to many who are not
enrolled (and in some cases not even technically eligible for enrollment under the
tribe's own constitution). Indians do not have to enroll formally to obtain tribal
benefits in many tribes; some even have a separate roll for internal purposes or an
informal "census roll."
400. See supra notes 371, 399.
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In particular, St. Cloud's hierarchical factors should be disor-
dered and unweighted. The "well-settled" Rogers test allows
tribes, as social and political quasi-sovereigns, the power to deter-
mine their membership. A fundamental aspect of sovereignty is, of
course, the ability to determine membership in the sovereign. 40 1
"Social" factors should not be relegated to the bottom of the court's
consideration list. Similarly, Anglo-American concepts of the polit-
ical (e.g. democratic voting) must not predominate over what is
rightfully the group's view of its own identity and membership.
40 2
For example, one can have a political effect without being able
to vote. State and federal courts should accord comity to tribal
courts in this regard. In Means v. District Court of the Chinle Ju-
dicial District, Chief Justice Yazzie of the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court observed that Means, a member of the Oglala Sioux Nation,
claimed he was not allowed to vote or attain any political office
within the Navajo Nation, but was able to attend chapter meet-
ings and "led a march to the court house for a demonstration to
make a 'broad statement' about political activities of the Navajo
Nation."40 3 Nevertheless, conflating enrollment with membership
and without even addressing the Rogers test, the Ninth Circuit
held that "[als an Oglala-Sioux, Means can never become a mem-
ber of the Navajo political community, no matter how long he
makes the Navajo reservation his home."40 4
Lastly, it seems settled that the federal government might
recognize someone as an Indian even though no tribe intervenes to
testify and there is no other evidence of tribal recognition.40 5 In
that situation it might be helpful for the court to appoint a guard-
ian ad litem to help assess the significance of the more subjective
cultural contacts.406
401. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978)).
402. See Deloria & Newton, supra note 19, at text accompanying n.63 (questioning impo-
sition of Lockean social contract theory on Indian tribes).
403. Means v. Dist. Ct. of the Chinle Jud. Dist., 26 Indian Law Rptr. 6083, 6085 (Navajo
Nation Sup. Ct. 1999).
404. Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 2005).
405. See State v. Bonaparte, 759 P.2d 83, 85 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
406. Ideally, each tribe would appoint a representative to act in the best interests of
tribal sovereignty. In the alternative, a federally appointed guardian ad litem would be
consonant with the wardship relationship and responsibility.
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V. POST-LARA OBSERVATIONS
It is now apparent that the judiciary created a constitutional
crisis by choosing a myopic view of Indian membership, resulting
in the tremendous number of Indians categorized as nonmembers.
Had it not been for the relatively recent erosion of broadly defined
Indian member status under federal common law, the Duro deci-
sion would have had little impact on tribal sovereignty and there
would have been little political impetus for a "fix." By returning to
the pre-1990 reality of Indian status, more Indians would be
deemed non-enrolled members rather than as nonmembers or
non-Indians. With the Duro-fix as statutory guide, it is time for
the courts to restore the concept of membership espoused by the
Rogers Court and Felix Cohen, which includes recognition of an
individual as an Indian by his or her tribe or community. 40 7 Thus,
the constitutional crisis may be averted to a great extent by har-
monizing the Duro I decision and the Duro-fix legislation through
a definition of Indian status based on significant contacts. The in-
terpretation of the Indian status test suggested by this Article, as
compared to other interpretations, has the advantage of align-
ment with the congressional intent of the Duro-fix. In addition, a
similar notion of significant contacts between ethnic Indians and
the federal government solves the problem of nonmember Indians,
who by the definition recommended in this Article are recognized
by another tribe and have insignificant contacts with the tribe ex-
ercising criminal jurisdiction.
Congress also could nullify the racial attack by acknowledg-
ing that tribal criminal jurisdiction is a function of membership408
or recognized consent, and need not be linked to race. This would
entail dropping the first prong from the Rogers test and would re-
spect the wishes of some tribes to decide that a specific blood
quantum is not a requirement of membership. To this aim, courts
over the last century have proven able to distinguish the Rogers
407. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
408. Citizenship is the preferred term because membership connotes a club rather than
a semi-sovereign nation. See Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Re-
quirements for Indian Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 437, 437 n.3 (2002). Professor
Goldberg
came to believe that the term "membership" is used in tribal constitutions rather
than "citizenship" because the Bureau of Indian Affairs did not treat these consti-
tutions as charters for governments. Rather, they viewed them as some variation
on private associations or student councils, designed to instruct Indian people in
self-government rather than to facilitate genuine self-determination.
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recognition prong from the general legal norms of territorial sov-
ereignty and implied consent. Accordingly, the concerns repre-
sented by former Senator and Washington Attorney General
Slade Gorton 40 9 can be given adequate deference because mem-
bership is not based on geography. Tribal criminal jurisdiction
could be easily avoided, for example, by reservation residents who
eschew sustained socio-political contact with the tribe.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of who is an Indian for purposes of criminal ju-
risdiction is considered by Congress to be a well-settled area of
law as a result of two hundred years of common law and federal
legislation. This Article demonstrates, however, that the judicial
branches of state and federal government do not often agree with
that congressional assessment. The challenges of federal Indian
law are only growing more complicated due to tribal demographic
trends. 410 Like the Israelites in the diaspora, Indians today are
confronted with the problem of maintaining a sense of identity in
the face of a dominant culture that views society through the lens
of integration and separation. This Article exhorts the judiciary to
focus less on formal enrollment 4ll and to restore the second prong
of the Rogers test to its proper role as a measurement of Indian
tribal identification in the socio-political sense. Courts must meet
the challenge of sifting the grain of Indian status from the chaff
within recent lower court decisions. Only by so doing will the con-
gressional intent of the Duro-fix be honored and the pressure of
equal protection concerns be relieved.
409. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Attorney General, State of Washington, Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (No. 76-5729). See supra text accompanying
notes 381-82.
410. See generally Gould, Mixing Bodies, supra note 30.
411. Motivated in part by Equal Protection concerns, the dissent proposes a new test
for determining Indian status; one that would conflate our two-pronged Rogers in-
quiry and multifaceted "recognition" guidelines into a single question: whether the
individual is enrolled or eligible for enrollment in a federally recognized tribe. From
a purely conceptual standpoint, we agree that eligibility for enrollment provides a
simpler framework within which we might judge Indian status as a political affilia-
tion with a formerly sovereign people. Nonetheless, it is not the test that we have
adopted, and until either Congress acts or the Supreme Court or an en banc panel of
our court revises the "recognition" prong of the Rogers test, we are bound by our
prior jurisprudence. In particular, we are bound by the body of case law which holds
that enrollment, and, indeed, even eligibility therefor, is not dispositive of Indian
status. In sum, we are not permitted to hold that these cases do not mean what they
say.
Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1225 (citations omitted).
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